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Abstract 
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Title: Margin Call on Morality: An Analysis of the Role of Morals in the 2007-2008 Financial 
Crisis 
Supervising Professor: Greg Hallman, Ph.D. 
Second Reader: Martin Kevorkian, Ph.D. 
 
 The causes of the 2007-2008 US financial crisis that nearly brought down the largest 
economy in world history are both complex and numerous. While the eventual bursting of the 
housing bubble that precipitated the collapse is the ultimate force that pushed the economy over 
the edge, the root causes extend all the way back to the Great Depression and the resulting 
government legislation passed in its wake. This legislation combined with future government 
intervention into the housing market and the rise of securitization from the private sector primed 
the economy for an apocalyptically catastrophic collapse, forcing millions of Americans out of 
homes, out of jobs, and into bankruptcy. While many suffers claim that the greed-fueled 
investment banks on Wall Street and their political counterparts in Washington are the ones to 
blame, the scale and scope of the crash are far too expansive to allow for any single individual, 
firm, or decision to be the sole source of blame. Ultimately, in order to answer the question of 
whether a lack of morals was what truly dismantled history’s largest ever economy requires 
revisiting nearly a century’s worth of build up. The following sections will attempt to do just 
that. 
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 4 
Introduction 
Towards the climax of J.C. Chandor’s film Margin Call, which examines the hours 
leading up to the start of the 2008 United States Housing Market Crash, Seth Bregman, a young 
analyst at an unnamed Wall Street investment bank loosely based on Lehman Brothers, arrives at 
the notion that his firm’s choosing to liquidate the entirety of their portfolio’s toxic assets in an 
attempt to avoid bankruptcy is “going to affect people...real people” (Chandor, 2011). Bregman, 
who has arrived at this juncture as an inexperienced, naïve analyst, makes the observation after 
learning that he will likely lose his job during a discussion with his floor head and immediate 
superior, Will Emerson. The short, yet cogent reaction to understanding that the bank’s selfish 
response will ripple beyond just Wall Street contrasts vividly with Emerson’s lengthy, cynical 
perspective of the situation: “Listen, if you really want to do [investment banking] with your life, 
you have to believe you’re necessary—and you are. If people want to live like this in their cars 
and big fuckin’ houses they can’t even pay for, then you’re necessary. The only reason that they 
all get to continue living like kings is ‘cause we got our fingers on the scales in their favor” 
(Chandor, 2011). This reviling diatribe uncovers the root of what many people consider to be the 
cause of what later became titled “The Great Recession of 2008”: the massive international 
banks of Wall Street urging mortgage lenders to knowingly lend money to unqualified 
candidates, all in the search of increasing profit for all financial parties involved. This seemingly 
morally bereft system of lending to unqualified individuals was furthered by the extreme 
amounts of cash that these banks were able to cheaply borrow. The idea behind the banks’ 
borrowing money, known as financial leveraging, is to assume debt in exchange for the ability to 
use the borrowed capital to increase an investment and hopefully maximize its future payout. 
While this strategy has the potential to augment the investor’s returns, it also has the ability to 
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exacerbate their losses if the investment goes poorly, leaving the borrower legally obligated to 
repay the creditor both the principal borrowed as well as the interest accumulated during the life 
of the contract. This toxic combination of extreme leveraging with an industry that appeared void 
of any sense of morality allowed for the United States’ housing market, a $228 Billion industry, 
to bring the $15 Trillion United States economy to its knees in a matter of months. 
This crash of the American economy in 2007 and 2008 brought about financial, personal, 
and social catastrophes matched by only a few other singular events in this nation’s history. 
Many key financial buzzwords such as “subprime lending,” “mortgage-backed securities,” 
“credit default swaps,” and “synthetic collateralized debt obligations” sit at the epicenter of what 
brought about this monumental collapse of the largest economy in world history. However, many 
people believe that the underlying root of the collapse extends beyond convoluted financial 
jargon and into a matter of human morality. Blame has been placed on CEOs, mortgage lenders, 
politicians, and even the average American citizen alike—with calls for legal action against those 
who the sufferers claim to be responsible. Accusations of intentional morally-deprived financial 
practices have been made since the collapse, yet only one individual, a 41-year-old executive at 
Credit Suisse named Kareem Serageldin, has been dealt prison time, having been sentenced to a 
mere 30 months in federal prison for intentionally hiding millions of dollars of losses by his firm.  
The aim of this thesis is to analyze this exact anomaly. With such large a discrepancy 
existing between the number of people blamed for the crash and the number of people sentenced 
in a court of law, what role did the morals, or lack thereof, of the accused play in the overall 
collapse? Was Wall Street truly an ecosystem ripe with fraudulent crooks looking to con 
unassuming American citizens simply in the name of making a bonus on top of their already 
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multi-million-dollar salary? Or was the collapse simply a result of a long line of miscalculated 
bets fueled on by blissful naiveté?  
To answer these questions and others requires understanding the underlying toxicity of 
the financial system that led up to the 2008 collapse, including revisiting the United States’ focus 
on increasing homeownership over the last century, comprehending the complexity of the 
financial instruments involved, studying how various banks miscalculated the value of their 
assets and to what extent they did so, unraveling the devolution from honest political policies to 
deliberately immoral financial practices, and much more.  
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Chapter 1: The History of U.S. Housing Policy 
“The wrong solution to a genuine problem” – William Niskanen (1995) 
 
Introduction 
Since the catastrophic years of post-Great Depression America, the focus of much of the 
United States government’s housing policy has been firmly centered on one main idea: 
increasing homeownership. The idea of an individual’s level of success in America has much to 
do with their ability to fully own his or her own home. To wholly own a home, thereby breaking 
a reliance on making monthly rental payments, allows the individual to establish a system of 
investments and savings through the development of home equity. However, with the idea that 
“the average [historical] home costs between two to three times [what the average family makes 
annually]” (NPR: A Giant Pool of Money), the capital required to invest in purchasing a home 
constitutes a significant portion of any individual’s net worth. Thus, the United States 
government’s goal has been to find an efficient and sustainable method for providing low- and 
moderate-income families with affordable home financing options. Government policies aimed 
at increasing homeownership have generally had one main method of doing so: increasing the 
liquidity of the mortgage market. 
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Government-Sponsored Enterprises  
The origination of the government-sponsored programs aimed at increasing overall 
homeownership, particularly for low- and moderate-income communities, began with the 
creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and shortly thereafter the Veterans 
Administration (VA). As part of the National Housing Act of 1934, the FHA offered federal 
insurance to mortgages lenders on the monthly payments of FHA-approved loans in exchange 
for a small fee as well as helped to regulate mortgage terms and their related interest rates. 
Similarly, the VA offered mortgage payment insurance to US veterans. Prior to the FHA’s 
inception, the norm for mortgages was a three-to-five year, floating rate, non-amortizing bond; 
however, this practice was replaced with the 30-year, fixed rate, fully amortizing bond that 
generally resembles many of the mortgages issued in the current day. 
Soon after the establishment of the FHA, an addition was made to the National Housing 
Act in the form of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), colloquially known as 
“Fannie Mae,” in 1938. FNMA’s goal was to expand the pool of individuals and families able to 
afford housing payments by providing mortgage lenders with cheap capital and guarantees on 
monthly payments for loans that met certain guidelines. 
According to Fannie Mae itself, the underlying idea behind its creation was “to provide 
liquidity and stability to the U.S. housing and mortgage market” (About Fannie Mae & Freddie 
Mac | Federal Housing Finance Agency) in order to expand upon the FHA’s original goal of 
increasing overall homeownership. The plan was to do so by purchasing mortgages that the 
lenders had distributed by means of assuming debt from large international or institutional 
investors. Because of its status as a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), FNMA would raise 
capital by selling bonds to investors with very low interest rates, which they would then use to 
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purchase mortgages that adhered to the FHA’s underwriting standards (Alford, 2003). By 
purchasing these mortgages, FNMA provided cheap and efficient capital to mortgage lenders, 
mortgage brokers, and other primary mortgage market partners, effectively allowing them to 
reinvest this new capital into providing additional mortgages with lowered interest rates to 
prospective homeowners who otherwise might have been considered non-creditworthy. All the 
while, the GSE now assumed the risk of mortgagor default normally taken on by the mortgage 
originator. Overall, Fannie Mae was successful in materially increasing the liquidity within the 
housing market while simultaneously establishing what came to be known as the “secondary 
mortgage market.”  
Since its inception, Fannie Mae had essentially established a monopoly over this 
secondary market, and, because of its status as a federally-backed enterprise, there was no single 
entity or conglomeration of entities that could provide the mortgage originators with capital as 
cheaply or efficiently as FNMA. This system, however, changed in the year 1968.  
Under public pressure during the Vietnam War and as a way to shed the debt 
accumulated by FNMA off of the government’s balance sheet, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
broke FNMA into the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)—commonly known 
as Ginnie Mae—and a new version of FNMA through the passing of the Housing and Urban 
Development Act (HUD) of 1968. GNMA acted very similarly to the original FNMA in that it 
was wholly-owned by the government and purchased only mortgages that were either FHA-, 
VA-, or HUD-sponsored and guaranteed the payments on these mortgages in exchange for a 
small fee. At the same time, Fannie became a publicly traded, quasi-shareholder-owned entity 
that was now able to purchase non-government-backed mortgages that still followed the strict 
underwriting guidelines of the FHA-, VA-, or HUD-sponsored mortgages under the implicit 
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backing of the federal government. Ultimately, this partitioning of the original FNMA into 
GNMA and FNMA further increased the liquidity of the US mortgage market by permitting a 
government-sponsored entity to transition and expand from public sector and to the private 
sector.  
Moreover, due to the fact that all senior equity of FNMA was owned by the US Treasury, 
the key aspect defining FNMA was that it was neither fully owned by the government nor fully 
owned by public shareholders, leaving it in a sort of no-man’s land compared to GNMA. While 
the HUD Act of 1968 allowed FNMA to become a publicly traded company, the firm continued 
to be federally regulated and reap the benefits of having an implicit financial backing by the 
federal government, allowing it to borrow money with which to purchase mortgages at heavily 
discounted rates. Thus, in order to mitigate FNMA’s monopoly in the secondary mortgage 
market, increase competition, and further expand the amount of available capital in the mortgage 
market, Congress passed the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 and established the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or “Freddie Mac”). Similar in both regulation and 
function as FNMA, FHLMC was chartered to purchase mortgages that were both government-
sponsored and non-government-sponsored, except was made to focus on the “thrift” industry, in 
comparison to FNMA’s focus on the traditional banking sector. Much like a traditional bank, 
thrifts accept deposits and provide interest payments; however, they are more heavily focused on 
home loans and other real estate ventures than traditional banks.  
 
Community Reinvestment Act 
 Despite the effectiveness of Freddie, Fannie, and Ginnie in increasing the liquidity of the 
overall mortgage market, there were still communities that many people believed to be 
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underserved, namely low-income and minority neighborhoods. In response to both public and 
congressional pressure, President Jimmy Carter passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
of 1977, which mandated “the obligation of federally insured depository institutions to help meet 
the credit needs of communities in which they are chartered, consistent with safe and sound 
operations” (“The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges,” 2007). 
The passing of the act was intended to combat the belief that many depository institutions would 
gladly accept deposits from individuals living within that institution’s community but were 
reluctant to provide them with loans. Most notably, the law sought to outlaw “redlining,” which 
is the “unethical practice that puts services (financial and otherwise) out of reach of residents of 
certain areas based on race, ethnicity, or location of residence” (Redlining | Investopedia), a 
practice that was common from the 1930s through the 1970s. This convention of not offering 
services to certain individuals is most widely recognized in the systematic denial of mortgages to 
prospective homeowners solely based on the default history of the community in which the they 
live, rather than the individual’s own creditworthiness.  
Over the subsequent decades since its passing, the CRA underwent a series of 
amendments that added to its overall reach and impact, including increasing the transparency of 
each depository institution’s loan practices to the public, raising the required minimum amount 
of loans provided to underserved communities, and restricting certain benefits to banks that 
failed to meet the CRA’s criteria.  
 Although the bill included the mandate that the banks better serve the communities in 
which they were based, many critics—bankers and community groups alike—criticized its actual 
effectiveness, citing that the criteria of assessment was far too subjective and emphasized the 
process over tangible results. In order to combat these complaints, President Bill Clinton added 
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an amendment to the bill in 1993 that aimed to clarify “performance standards, [to make] 
examinations and evaluations more consistent, and [to reduce] the compliance burden” (“The 
Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges,” 2007). The administration 
had now shifted the CRA’s review of firms from the original criterion being how many loans 
they had attempted to provide to being how many the lending agencies actually generated. 
Accordingly, the total number of mortgages provided to low-income families grew by nearly 
80% between 1993 and 2000 (Retsinas and Belsky, 2002). 
 Many critics of the CRA claim that the government’s mandate of requiring the depository 
institutions to invest their capital into riskier and likely less profitable projects is not only a 
hindrance to the overall economy but also an unnecessary contraction of the housing market, 
starkly in contrast to their stated end goal. Others simply cited the inefficiencies caused by 
forcing depository institutions to divert capital from better performing investments and into 
worse performing ones, an anti-capitalistic approach to the free market. Of the most important 
punishments enacted against depository institutions that failed to meet the CRA’s criteria was the 
limited ability for them to merge with or acquire other institutions. Former Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, is quoted at the Community Affairs Research Conference in 
March of 2007 as saying, “State and federal rules prohibited interstate branching or acquisitions 
in some cases even intrastate branching, reducing competition and the ability of lenders to 
diversify geographic risk.”  
Additionally, the pressure applied by the Clinton Administration augmented the total risk 
that the GSEs, particularly Fannie and Freddie, were forced to assume by requiring them to 
purchase higher and higher percentages of securities that were made up of “subprime” and non-
conforming loans throughout the late 1990s and into President George W. Bush’s term during 
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the early 2000s. Eventually, the accumulation of the overall debt taken on by Fannie and Freddie 
to meet the federally required standards intended to support housing for low- and moderate-
income communities nearly destroyed the two Goliaths of the secondary mortgage market in 
2007 and 2008.  
 
Conclusion 
  
 Many of the decisions made by the United States federal government throughout the 
course of the 20th century continually focused on the goal of increasing overall levels of 
homeownership in America. By establishing the GSEs of Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie, the 
government successfully decreased the cost of home financing through increased liquidity of the 
primary and secondary mortgage markets, thereby providing previously unqualified borrowers 
with a higher likelihood of establishing home equity by breaking their reliance upon making 
monthly rental payments. Although these government policies were based upon sound intentions, 
they inconspicuously led the US economy along a road that would eventually turn highly 
dangerous. In describing the policies—particularly the CRA—enacted by the US government 
towards housing, William Niskanen, formerly a member of Ronald Reagan’s Council of 
Economic Advisors and chairman of the Cato Institute, states that they were “the wrong 
[solutions] to a genuine problem, for the most part created by other government regulations” 
(Niskanen, 1995).  
 
 
 
 
 14 
Chapter 2: Asset-Backed Securities 
“You as an individual can diversity your risk. The system as a whole, though, cannot reduce the 
risk. And that’s where the confusion lies.” –Lawrence Lindsey (2011) 
 
 
Introduction   
Prior to the collapse of the American economy during the Great Depression, there existed 
a secondary mortgage market roughly resembling a very primitive version of today’s model. The 
majority of the mortgages that constituted this rudimentary market of the early 20th century were 
non-amortizing, floating rate, three-to-five year loans collateralized by farm property (Klaman, 
1959). These loans would then be individually sold to investors who would receive the rights to 
both the monthly principal and interest payments via the bank’s receipt of the mortgagor’s 
installments. Similar to the GSEs of today, these mortgage originators, known as mortgage 
guarantee houses, guaranteed the timely payment of both principal and interest to the investors in 
the case of default by the borrower for a small fee. Most, if not all, investors in this market 
expected to hold the loan to maturity as no true secondary market for trading mortgage loans 
existed at the time (McConnell & Buser, 2011). Although the specific elements of this 
elementary dynamic of borrower-lender-investor were to be replaced by post-Great Depression 
government policies, it had laid the foundation for one of the most influential markets in 
American economic history. 
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The Mortgage-Backed Security 
 Created by the pooling and securitization of any contractual obligation to pay a debt, such 
as credit card or student loans, an asset-backed security (ABS) is an investment instrument sold 
to investors who receive these regular payments made by the original borrowers of the 
underlying debt. When the specific assets underlying the security are mortgages, the instrument 
is now an aptly-named Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) with the regular payments to the 
investors being the monthly principal and interest installments paid by the mortgagors. As 
described by Michael Lewis in his The New York Times best-seller novel about the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine, “A mortgage bond wasn’t a single 
giant loan for an explicit fixed term. A mortgage bond was a claim on the cash flows from a pool 
of thousands of individual home mortgages” (Lewis, p. 7). 
 This process of turning individual mortgages into an investable security begins with a 
prospective homeowner contacting either a mortgage lender directly or by contacting a broker 
who then connects them to a lender. The lender and borrower come to an agreement about the 
size, lifespan, and interest rate of the loan, which is primarily based on current interest rates and 
the borrower’s credit history, value of assets, and level of savings. Once the lender has provided 
thousands of different borrowers with mortgages, the lender then sells the rights to most of these 
mortgages to a securities firm—to one of the three GSEs or to a private securities firm such as an 
investment bank—but keeps control of some in order to maintain a continuous flow of cash for 
themselves. The securities firm that purchased the whole mortgages bundles them together into a 
security that is then marketed and sold to investors in the form of bonds. As the monthly 
payments from the mortgagors are received by the originator, they are passed onto the securities 
firm who in turn pays the investors.  
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With the capital provided to the lender by the securities firm or GSE purchasing the 
mortgages, the lender is now able to reinvest this capital into additional loans. The ability for the 
mortgage lender to have a quickly replenished supply of capital with which to provide additional 
mortgages is what increases the market’s overall liquidity. Additionally, at all points along the 
pipeline from borrower to lender to issuer to investor, a small percentage is taken by each 
receiving party, with the lender charging a fee for originally developing the mortgage and 
collecting the monthly payments; the securities firm earning a fee for issuing the bonds and, in 
the case of the GSEs, for providing payment insurance; and the investor ultimately receiving the 
remaining monthly payments. While this process of securitization was instrumental in increasing 
the liquidity in both the primary and secondary mortgage markets, it also allowed for the GSEs, 
investment banks, or other securities firms to spread the risk assumed by holding the mortgages 
onto willing investors while still making a profit for themselves.  
 
The GSE-Sponsored MBS Market 
Initially offered in 1970 by GNMA with a face value of only $70 million, the first shares 
of MBSs were sold to investors who received pro-rated cash flows from the pooling of the 
monthly interest and principal payments of the FHA-, VA-, and HUD-sponsored loans that 
flowed through the pipeline from borrower to lender to issuer (GNMA in this case) to investor. 
This system of investors receiving pro-rated payments based on their ownership of the MBS is 
known as a simple pass-through security and was replicated by both FHLMC in 1971 and by 
FNMA in 1981. The creation of the MBS was “a further step along this path [to more liquidity]” 
(McConnell and Buser, 2011) as the tradeable MBS attracted a wider set of investors to the 
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mortgage market than just the GSEs, thereby increasing the market’s liquidity and further 
reducing the cost of home financing.  
Although GNMA was chartered to only purchase government-sponsored loans, FNMA 
and FHLMC’s statuses as shareholder-owned entities granted them the right to buy and sell both 
government-backed and non-government-backed loans so long as the loans were “conforming,” 
meaning they met the set of standards established by Fannie, Freddie, or Ginnie in regards to the 
loan’s size and the credit quality of the borrower but happened to not be federally sponsored. 
These restrictive standards, however, did not prevent FNMA or FHLMC from eventually 
becoming major players in the massive MBS market.  
 
The Multiclass MBS 
Despite the relative simplicity of the early MBS system, complexity quietly and quickly 
entered the equation in the form of the multiclass MBS, also known as a Collateralized Mortgage 
Obligation (CMO). First issued in 1983 by FHLMC and by FNMA in 1985, the CMO is similar 
to an MBS except that it is carved into “tranches,” or portions, with each segment receiving a 
credit rating based on its respective risk profile. Structured in descending order of security from 
the senior (AAA-rated) tranches, mezzanine (AA-, A-, BBB-, and BB-rated) tranches, and 
unrated equity tranche, this dividing of the CMO by risk allows investors to better customize 
particular aspects of their investment by following a “sequential pay” system.  
Sequential pay securities, such as the CMO, are organized in way that each tranche has 
separate payment schedules, differing levels of risk, and varying interest rates. The investors in 
the AAA-rated senior tranche have the first claim to the cash flows from the monthly interest and 
principal payments of the outstanding bonds until the bonds in this tranche are retired, while the 
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lower, subordinate tranches receive only monthly interest payments. Once the senior tranches’ 
principals are retired, the AA-rated portion of the mezzanine tranche undergoes the same process 
of receiving a percentage of the outstanding loan as principal payments in addition to interest 
installments, while the subordinate tranches still only receive interest until the entirety of the 
AA-rated bonds is retired. This system of waterfall payments continues until the bonds in the 
unrated equity tranche have been paid off.  
In addition to the lowest tranche having the last claim to the monthly principal payments, 
they are also the first tranche to be affected in the case of mortgagor default. If there are enough 
defaults to the point that the entirety of the lowest tranche does not receive their payments, the 
next lowest tranche is now affected in the same way as the one below it, with this system 
working in reverse order of the sequential pay schedule. This system is often compared to a 
building in the middle of a flood with the investor of the lowest tranche being the owner of a 
ground floor unit. As the flood begins, the ground floor is the first level to be affected, while the 
higher floors remain untouched. As the water continues to rise, the second floor is only affected 
once the entire ground floor has been flooded, while the penthouse units (the most senior 
tranches) are only affected when every floor below it has already been flooded. In essence, the 
subordinate tranches act as a cushion for the more senior tranches against potential defaults. 
Given that the lowest tranches have much later bond maturity dates and are exposed to 
the most risk of mortgagors defaulting, these tranches are given significantly higher interest 
rates. On the other hand, the higher rungs of the CMO ladder receive lower interest rates in 
exchange for earlier payment schedules and better protection against defaults. This exposure of 
the most subordinate tranches to a potential cessation in payments is known as “Credit (or 
Default) Risk.” Although this risk was recognized in the early MBS market, it was rarely 
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considered when making investment decisions because these monthly mortgage payments were 
fully guaranteed by the GSE involved.  
 
Types of Mortgage-Backed Security Risk 
Due to the length of a 30-year mortgage, investors in every tranche of the MBS are 
susceptible to the risk that any long-term bond faces; however, the dynamic developed by the 
sequential pay CMO allows investors to choose which of the two types of risk inherent to MBS 
they prefer to assume: Credit Risk or Interest Rate Risk, the latter of which can be further 
subdivided into two additional types. 
As with all bonds, a change in interest rates affects the relative value of the bond 
currently being held, meaning the holder can potentially suffer losses or capture gains in the 
process depending on the change. Given that most fixed-rate mortgages (particularly those that 
are sponsored by the FHA, VA, or HUD or are otherwise GSE-conforming) can be paid off at 
any time without penalty, when interest rates drop, mortgagors have an incentive to pay off their 
loans early in order refinance into a lower rate loan. When these debtors choose to prepay and 
refinance their mortgage at a lower rate, the investors receive their money back sooner than 
anticipated, no longer receive the future monthly interest payments, and are only able to reinvest 
their capital at the new lower rate. This exposure to receiving their investment sooner than 
anticipated is known as “Prepayment Contraction” risk as the life of the bond is being shortened 
by the unexpected increase in prepayments. This form of risk is what Michael Lewis labels in his 
novel as the most “problematic” aspect of attracting investors to the early, GSE-driven MBS 
market. 
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On the other hand, these bonds are also subject to the possibility of a rise in interest rates. 
When the interest rates rise, the value of the bond experiences a relative devaluation, causing a 
loss for the investor as they are not able to reinvest the money tied up in the bond at the new 
higher rate. Furthermore, when interest rates rise, prepayments by the debtors will be lower than 
anticipated. Because the security issuer generates a model of the bond payments based on the 
size of the loans, amount of investors, and predictions about mortgagors’ prepayments, the 
model’s expectations of cash flows to investors will now change, effectively extending the 
timeline of the security’s payments. Now, “the security pays later than expected, and the investor 
cannot take advantage of the more attractive investment opportunities [of the higher rate] with 
those funds” (SEC Staff Report on MBS, 2003). This subset of interest rate risk is known as 
“Prepayment Extension” risk.  
These inherent risks involved in investing in MBSs is what pushed the market to develop 
the tranched, sequential pay bonds. According to McDonnell and Buser in their 2011 report titled 
“The Origins and Evolution of the Market for Mortgage Backed Securities,”  
 
“[The] idea [of tranches] was that some investors were reluctant to become 
active in the MBS market because their long-term maturities coupled with the 
mortgagor’s prepayment option means that the actual maturity of the 
security is unknown and can be quite long term, thereby exposing a potential 
investor to substantial interest rate risk, while at the same time exposing the 
investor to a great deal of uncertainty as to the actual maturity date of the 
security. Sequential pay CMOs were thought to be a way of overcoming the 
disadvantages of simple MBSs in that an investor who preferred a shorter-
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term security could buy an early tranche, whereas one who was willing to 
bear more risk (possibly in return for a higher yield) would be attracted to 
the later pay tranches.” 
 
Thus, through the new method of investing based on differing risks, payments, and interest rates, 
investors can now better access securities matching their desired risk, return, and maturity needs, 
ultimately attracting more investors and further increasing the liquidity of the market.  
Although this process of securitization of mortgages was quite young and not widely 
spread, a 1989 study observed that “between 1977 and 1987, the interval during which FNMA 
and FHLMC became active in the MBS market, the percentage of conforming loans that were 
securitized by FNMA and FHLMC increased from less than 5% to more than 50%” (Hendershott 
& Schilling, 1989). Through this creation and subsequent evolution of the MBS, the combination 
of the financial strength of the GSEs created what came to be the highly liquid and highly 
profitable secondary mortgage market. 
 
Private Label MBSs 
 As the secondary mortgage market came to be essentially monopolized by the GSEs, 
private companies sought the ability to enter the market by doing what the government standards 
prevented Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie from doing: creating MBSs from non-conforming 
mortgages. In the year 1977, a bond trader for Salomon Brothers named Lewis Ranieri followed 
in the footsteps of the GSEs by developing what came to be known as “non-agency” or “Private 
Label” Mortgage-Backed Securities (PLS). Unlike the early MBSs whose payments were backed 
by one of the three government agencies (Fannie, Freddie, or Ginnie) and for which there existed 
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almost no consideration regarding the effects of a default of the underlying mortgages, Ranieri’s 
MBS was composed of mortgages that FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA were barred from 
purchasing, either due to the loan’s size (“Jumbo” Loans) or its payment plan (“Adjustable-Rate” 
Mortgages), or because of the borrower’s credit history, their unverifiable/inconsistent income 
(“Alt-A” loans), or the lack of documentation (“no-doc” or “low-doc” loans). Many of these non-
conforming mortgages were simple adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), option ARMs, hybrid 
ARMs, or merely “subprime” loans, which were mortgages given to individuals with weak 
financial histories or who had not yet established strong credit.  
Unlike the standards required for the fixed-rate, GSE-qualifying loans, ARMs are 
mortgages whose interest rates are based upon an index, such as the London Inter-bank Offering 
Rate (LIBOR) or the federal funds rate, plus a few hundred basis points, and are readjusted 
regularly. Option ARMs are ARMs that allow the borrower the option to rollover their monthly 
principal and interest payments so long as they agree to pay the total accumulated amount by the 
loan’s maturation date. A hybrid ARM is a form of ARM in which the borrower pays an initially 
low “teaser” rate that lasts for the first few years of the loan and is then regularly readjusted 
according to an index similar to the standard ARM. All of these types of mortgages fall into the 
overarching categories of “nonprime” and non-conforming loans.  
 The main risk involved in investing in the early GSE-issued MBSs is not whether the 
investors would receive their payments, but rather that they would receive them too early in 
response to refinancing at lower interest rates. In fact, “The big fear of the 1980s mortgage bond 
investor was that he would be repaid too quickly, not that he would fail to be repaid at all” 
(Lewis, p. 7). The private-label MBS replaced this issue of prepayment contraction risk with that 
of default risk. Now, the investors in the lower tranches of the securities composed of non-
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conforming mortgages with non-standardized payment schedules and without financial backing 
from a GSE were no longer vulnerable to just early or extended repayment but also to simply no 
repayment at all.  
While the non-agency MBS is nearly identical in both structure and function to the 
agency MBS, the private label version is now subject to different and compounded forms of risk, 
meaning these investors would require higher payouts in exchange for the increased risk. As 
such, the securities firms issuing the bonds began engineering new, more complex methods for 
investing.  
 
Collateralized Debt Obligations and CDOs-Squared 
In addition to the securitization of mortgages, the markets of the 1980s began 
securitizing various types of loans, including “equipment leases, credit card debt, auto loans, and 
manufactured housing loans” (FCIC Report, 2011). Simultaneously, the amount of outstanding 
debt in the US credit markets grew nearly three-fold during the 1980s (Kimberly, 2019). With 
this growth in the outstanding debt market, other investment instruments similar to the ABS 
grew in popularity, namely the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). First issued in 1987 by an 
investment bank and structured very similarly to the multiclass MBS, the CDO is divided into 
tranches with various risk profiles with corresponding payment structures; however, the 
underlying assets composing the CDO differ from both the agency and non-agency MBSs. 
Although the non-triple-A-rated tranches of the MBSs generate relatively high returns with 
relatively stable risk, it was not uncommon for the issuers to struggle to find investors for these 
tranches. In order to overcome this obstacle, Wall Street turned to its counterparts.  
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When a securities firm, such as Lehman Brothers, struggles to find investors for various 
tranches of their MBS—most commonly occurring with the mezzanine tranches—they take these 
unsold investments and sell them to another investment bank, Morgan Stanley for example, or to 
a CDO manager (an independent 
entity or trust formed specifically to 
underwrite and issue CDOs; it is also 
called a specialized purpose vehicle or 
“SPV”). After pooling together 
thousands of other regularly paying 
assets such as the ones mentioned 
above, Morgan Stanley takes the 
recently purchased shares of the 
mezzanine tranches from the Lehman 
Brothers and combines them with the 
other regularly paying assets, creating 
a CDO. By combining differing types of assets that appear uncorrelated, the CDO is now 
considered to be more diversified, thereby lowering the credit risk associated with it. As such, 
the formerly rated AA, A, BBB, and B segments of the underlying MBS’ mezzanine tranche can 
now be lumped in with the other regularly paying assents and be labeled as AAA-rated 
investments in the CDO, with the cash flows to investors being dependent upon the cash flow 
from these mezzanine tranches of the underlying MBS and the additional regularly paying assets 
(See figure above for a visual explanation). Effectively, the CDO had found a way to 
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mathematically justify upgrading the risk profile of the MBS’ mezzanine tranche without 
changing its underlying assets, citing the benefits of increased diversification.  
This process of selling off the unsold mezzanine tranches of MBSs to CDO managers 
who would then package them into a new investment security and relabel it as AAA became 
increasingly popular through the late 1990s and particularly into the early and mid-2000s, and 
“By 2004, creators of CDOs were the dominant buyers of the BBB-rated tranches of mortgage-
backed securities...[and] by 2005, they were buying ‘virtually all’ of the BBB tranches” (Laurie 
Goodman et al, 2011). While the popularity of the MBS-backed CDOs grew, the SPVs and 
investment banks created an even more complicated security: the “CDO squared.”  
Similar to the process of a CDO issuer purchasing the unsold mezzanine tranches of 
MBSs, the mezzanine tranches of the CDOs also experienced difficulties in finding willing 
investors. Once again, Wall Street turned to its counterparts: underwriters for other CDOs began 
purchasing these unsold mezzanine tranches of CDOs to repackage them into their own CDO, 
and, by using the same prior logic of diversification, can relabel them as AAA in the new CDO. 
When the underlying assets of a CDO came to be constituted by around 80% of another CDO, 
this new CDO is now called a “CDO squared.” This ever-growing pipeline from mortgagor to 
mortgage originator to MBS issuer to CDO manager number 1 to CDO manager number 2 to 
investor distanced the ultimate cash flow recipient so far from the underlying asset that the 
ability for any one individual to accurately comprehend what exactly it was they were investing 
in became increasingly more difficult.  
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Credit Default Swaps 
 Following the surging MBS and CDO markets, Wall Street looked for additional, further 
complex instruments with which to provide to the market for investments. It did so in the form of 
derivatives based on asset-backed securities, most notably the mortgage-backed CDOs. A 
derivative is a type of “financial security with a value that is reliant upon, or derived from, an 
underlying asset or pool of assets” (Derivative | Investopedia) that involves a contract between 
two or more parties. One form of a derivative, a swap, is an agreement between two parties to 
“swap” liabilities, cash flows, or interest rate agreements for a given period of time. In the case 
of the mortgage-backed CDO market, Wall Street created the Credit Default Swap (CDS).  
This form of credit derivative involves a party that agrees to take on the risk that the 
value of the underlying mortgages of the mortgage-backed CDO drops in exchange for receiving 
monthly payments. These monthly payments come from a second party who now essentially 
receives insurance on the value of the CDO. The most common way in which the security’s 
value would drop is in the case of a mortgagor’s default. When the debtor all the way back and 
the beginning of the pipeline defaults, the value of the CDO to which the payment is flowing 
decreases. And, when enough of the debtors of the underlying assets default, the payments to the 
CDO investors slow, leaving the CDO with a lower value. However, as long as the referenced 
assets perform, the individual owning the swap will continue to make regular payments for the 
life of the bond.  
The individual who is paying the regular installments in exchange for security against 
potential defaults is said to have a “short” position on the asset and does so either as a way to 
hedge against their prior investments or simply as a way to bet against the value of the 
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referenced asset. The other individual who has promised to reimburse in the case of defaults is 
said to be in a “long” position, believing that the asset will retain its value over time. 
A key component of the CDS is that neither of the two parties involved in the contract 
necessarily need to own the rights to the cash flows generated by the CDO, as the agreement 
between the two parties is solely based on the value of the CDO itself and not on the actual 
ownership of the referenced assets. Because of this fact, an individual may invest in a CDS 
solely based on what they believe will happen to the value of the CDO in the future. 
Furthermore, since there is no true ownership involved, there is no need to generate new assets in 
order to sell these swaps. In fact, a single asset is able to be referenced by multiple swaps, so 
long as there is a willing individual on either side of the contract. 
 
Synthetic CDOs 
Similar to the process of a CDO re-securitizing a security (the mezzanine tranches of 
MBSs for example), credit default swaps were able to be pooled together and re-securitized in 
the form of “synthetic” CDOs. Unlike the traditional cash CDOs, synthetic CDOs do not contain 
any physical assets but only the contracts that made up the CDSs. The synthetic CDOs are 
tranched according to varying risk profiles similar to a CDO, but are then further subdivided 
according to the type of long-positioned investors: “funded” investors and “unfunded” investors.  
A funded investor is one who actually spends cash to purchase shares in the synthetic CDO. 
 28 
These investors receive interest and principal payments throughout the life of the contract so 
long as the securities perform; however, in the case of defaults, the cash used in purchasing 
shares of the synthetic CDO acts as the first source of repayment to the short investor. Thus, the 
funded investors are the first to suffer if 
the value of the asset decreases  
Conversely, an unfunded investor 
is an individual who enters into a swap 
contract with the CDO, only making 
profit via the regular payments from the 
short investors if the CDO performs. If 
the referenced asset performs poorly 
enough to the point that the cash spent by 
the funded investors does not cover the 
amount owed to the short investor, the 
unfunded investors are called upon to 
cover the remaining amount. In this 
waterfall dynamic of payments in the case of underperformance by the asset, the claim to 
premium payments made by the short investors go to the unfunded investors while the funded 
receive only monthly interest and principal payments (See figure above). In essence, investing in 
a synthetic CDO is less of an investment into a security and more of a bet on the ability of the 
underlying assets to perform. 
As this highly complex instrument made its way into the wide range of securities 
developed by the investment banks, the final payment recipient became further and further 
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distanced from the initial cash source. In turn, investors at all points along the way became 
increasingly reliant upon the ability of credit rating agencies to accurately predict the risk profile 
of the end investment.  
 
Credit Rating Agencies 
 When investors are offered the differing tranches into which they are able to invest, the 
risk profile of each tranche follows the previously mentioned six-level scale from AAA down to 
the unrated equity tranche. Although the securities firms and GSEs are the parties issuing the 
investments, they are not the ones developing and labeling the risk profiles; that job is done 
almost exclusively by two certified rating agencies: Moody’s and Standard & Poors. 
Throughout the entire process of securitization, benefits are reaped by all parties 
involved. Borrowers who were previously labeled non-creditworthy are now able to take out 
loans with generally lower interest rates, lenders garner wages on the fees for originating and 
managing the loans, securities firms earn fees for issuing the securities, credit rating agencies 
receive payments for risk evaluation, and investors earn higher interest rates than on similar 
investments like Treasury notes while believing that they have comparable levels of risk. 
However, because the investors came to be further and further distanced from the actual assets in 
which they were investing, the ability for them to accurately value what they were purchasing 
became quite difficult. Thus, the securities firms and investors alike turned to verified credit 
rating agencies to determine the risk profile of each security.   
 The process of rating mortgage-backed securities is highly dependent upon two crucial 
pieces of criterion. First, the agencies must be able to determine the default probabilities of each 
individual mortgage within the entire pool of thousands of mortgages; second, they must be able 
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to determine the level of correlation between each loan across the entirety of the pool that 
constituted the security. The rule of thumb is higher diversification means higher stability of the 
security.  
The general starting point for establishing an investment’s credit rating is based upon 
related historical data. When looking at the housing market, home price values had historically 
always trended upwards with some exceptions occurring in the midst of economic downturns. In 
fact, according to a report by Nobel Laureate, Yale economist, and author of the infamous book 
Irrational Exuberance, Robert J. Shiller, the home value for the average house in America had 
increased nearly three-times over from the early 1940s to its peak in July of 2006 after adjusting 
for inflation (Shiller, 2006), suggesting that the seemingly ever increasing value of homes was 
here to stay. Moreover, delinquency rates on mortgages had remained low with an average of 
only 1.7% of mortgage loans being “seriously delinquent” (meaning they in the process of 
foreclosing or are at least 90 days past due date) from 1979 to 2006 (Mayer et al., 2008). 
Together, this historical data suggested that the default rates of the individual mortgages 
underlying the MBSs would continue to be low, and, due to the geographical and compositional 
diversification of the MBSs, CDOs, and CDOs squared, the correlation between the underlying 
assets was minimal enough that it did not pose a material risk. Thus, the credit rating agencies 
had justification to continue relabeling the CDOs and CDOs squared composed of AA-, BBB- 
and BB-rated tranches from prior securities as AAA investments.  
Although the rationale behind the process is financially tenable according to their models, 
the data being used was not characteristic of what the housing market would eventually become. 
Despite this fact, however, very few people ever seemed to care to realize the minimal extent of 
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applicability their outdated models truly had in the evolving securitization market of the 21st 
century. 
 
Conclusion 
 The landscape of the American financial industry underwent a significant evolution 
throughout the second half of the 20th and into the early 21st century. With a rise in asset 
securitization, an ever-developing complexity of investable instruments, and decades of stable 
economic growth, the evolutions of the industry appeared to be solid on the surface and backed 
by bona fide financial fluency. However, many of these aforementioned creations, coupled with 
a political focus on increasing homeownership for less qualified buyers, primed the world’s 
largest ever economy for what would be a collapse of catastrophic proportion. 
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Chapter 3: The Build Up 
“We had convinced ourselves we were in a less risky world.” –Lawrence Lindsey (2011) 
 
Introduction 
The 1980s and 1990s, decades known as The Great Moderation, were characterized by 
strong growth in the United States’ economy, moderate inflation, general deregulation of the 
financial industry, low unemployment, and technological revolutions. While some economists 
feared that by the late 1990s, this combination of economic expansion and declination of 
unemployment would undoubtedly lead to uncontrolled inflation, Alan Greenspan, then 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, resisted urges to raise interest rates as he argued that 
“increased productivity, including the fruits of the internet revolution, had increased the pace of 
sustainable growth [for the country]” (Pradnya & Appelbaum, A History of Fed Leaders and 
Interest Rates). As the potentials created by this revolution, namely the commercialization of the 
internet, excited investors, the perceived values of publicly and privately funded technology 
companies who had not even begun to generate revenue were skyrocketing. Between the years 
1995 to 2000, the Nasdaq composite market index quintupled from a value of 1,052.13 to its 
March 10th peak of 5048.62 (NASDAQ Composite – 45 Year Historical Chart), with stock values 
of companies like Qualcomm rising nearly 2,718% over a single year. This extraordinary growth, 
however, only lasted until middle of the year 2000, when the NASDAQ index began a sharp 
decline of nearly 43% over a four-month span to a year-low of 2332.78 (NASDAQ Composite – 
45 Year Historical Chart), an event known as the bursting of the Dot Com Bubble. 
Even with such a precipitous bursting of the Dot Com Bubble and a resulting stagnation 
of the US economy, unemployment remained at a 30-year low of around 4%. Attempting to fend 
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of a recession and to reenergize the economy, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
announced in January of 2001 that it was cutting the federal funds rate by 50 basis points, 
lowering it from 6% down to 5.5%. Over the course of the next eight months, the FOMC 
continually lowered the federal funds rate down to 3.5% by September 2001. As the economy 
remained sluggish, the already low consumer sentiment was only furthered by the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centers in New York, New York and the Pentagon 
in Washington D.C., forcing Greenspan to act.  
As a way to increase consumer confidence, lower the cost of debt, and incentivize 
spending, the Federal Reserve subsequently continued to lower the federal funds rate to an 
eventual 45-year low of around 1% by June 2003 (Federal Reserve Lowers Key Rate to 1%, 
Lowest Level Since 1958, 2003), hovering around such levels until the middle of 2004 (In Policy 
Shift, Fed Calls a Halt to Raising Rates, 2006). Although Greenspan’s decision to decrease the 
rates to such a low level successfully helped to revitalize the United States’ economy, it also 
inconspicuously planted the seed for what would allow the housing market to grow into a bubble 
so large in size that it would eventually cripple the country by 2008: cheap and ample capital.  
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Shadow Banking 
 The lending industry in the early part of the 20th century was composed of two main 
types of depository institutions: banks and thrifts (also called savings and loans associations or 
“S&L”). The former of the two accepted deposits from customers and in turn loaned out this 
money to other individuals as well as invested it in securities, while the latter also accepted 
deposits and generated loans but primarily focusing on mortgages and other real estate 
investments. This system remained in place until the Great Depression, when, as a protection 
against bank runs during moments of expected economic downturns, the U.S. government 
established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as a part of the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933. This government entity provided insurance to a bank customer’s deposits in exchange 
for a small fee paid by the bank. Although the passing of this act helped to protect both 
traditional banks and S&Ls against bank runs, it also regulated banks’ activities by preventing 
them from taking on excessive risk while establishing a cap on the interest rates that the two 
institutions are allowed to pay depositors, known as Regulation Q. The Glass-Steagall Act, in 
combination with the promise of The Federal Reserve, founded in 1913, to act as a lender of last 
resort to banks short on cash, established the norm for banking and thrift institutions for much of 
the next 50 years. 
 During the 1970s, however, financial institutions outside of traditional banks and S&Ls 
sought to enter the lending market with firms such as Vanguard and Fidelity establishing money 
market mutual funds (MMMFs). In comparison to deposits in commercial banks or S&Ls, 
deposits into MMMFs are not insured by the FDIC but are able to receive higher interest rates, 
driven by the returns on investments made by the funds. In fact, these “deposits” are not truly 
deposits but purchases of shares of the MMMF that are often redeemable daily. The idea behind 
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it is that the MMMF invests the shareholders’ “deposits” into high-grade, short-term securities 
such as Treasury bonds (T-bonds) or short-term corporate debt of highly rated companies. 
Because the companies managing MMMFs are neither banks nor thrifts, they are not subject to 
the same levels of regulation as these institutions, meaning they can offer higher return rates to 
the shareholders in exchange for the risk of not having the backing the FDIC’s deposit insurance. 
In exchange for the lack of FDIC-sponsored insurance, the fund implicitly promises to retain the 
full $1 net asset value (NAV) of the shareholder’s purchase. If the NAV of a share drops below 
$1, this is called “breaking the buck” and generally causes a run on the fund by investors.  
Despite MMMFs’ lack of an explicit guarantee of the FDIC, many depositors believe 
these funds to be almost as equivalently as safe as deposits into an FDIC-insured account. In 
turn, business began exploding in the late 1970s, with the assets deposited into MMMFs 
increasing from $3 Billion in 1977 to more than $740 Billion in 1995 and $1.64 Trillion by the 
end of 1999 (Wilmarth, 2002). The skyrocketing amounts of money being invested into these 
MMMFs allowed the fund managers to invest in additional forms of high-grade, short-term 
loans, fueling a massive expansion of supply in the short-term lending market. Once again, Wall 
Street found the perfect candidates in their financial counterparts: the commercial paper and 
“repo” markets.  
 Like long-term corporate debt, commercial paper is unsecured (not backed by a physical 
asset but rather a company’s promise to repay the loan) yet has a lifespan of only 270 days or 
less. The reduced lifespan of commercial paper in comparison to other forms of corporate debt 
allows for the borrowed capital to have reduced interest rates. Additionally, if the lender agrees, 
the borrower is often able to continually “roll over” the loan when it has reached its original 
repayment date with the borrower agreeing to pay additional interest in the end. Because the 
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loans are backed solely by the borrower’s word that they will be able to repay, only large, 
highly-rated, financially-stable firms are able to easily access this market. Although the 
commercial paper market had existed for decades, the practice grew significantly starting in the 
1970s.   
 The other lending market that grew in popularity during the 1970s was the repurchase 
agreements market, or “repo” market. Like the commercial paper market, the repo market was 
fueled by companies’ needs for short-term capital with low interest rates. However, in exchange 
for providing a borrower with a short-term loan, the lender is given an asset to hold as collateral 
in the case that the borrower is unable to pay. When the loan’s maturity date arrives, the 
borrower returns the capital with interest and receives back the assets that acted as collateral 
from the lender. While this process mirrors that of most short-term lending, a repo agreement 
actually involves a buyer and a seller instead of a borrower and lender. The “borrower” of the 
capital sells the assets to the “lender” with an agreement to repurchase the assets at a future date, 
sometimes within a day, with interest. Like the commercial paper market, repo agreements may 
be rolled over frequently.  
Acting as an intermediary between the MMMFs—many of whom were already 
sponsored by investment banks—and the institutions borrowing the capital, large Wall Street 
investment banks became the clearing institutions for these short-term financing markets. These 
parallel, three-pronged markets for lending outside of the traditional banking system constituted 
part of what came to be coined as “shadow banking,” a catch-all phrase for many financial 
activities that occur between non-bank financial entities beyond the jurisdiction of federal 
regulators. Overall, the growth of these two markets provided the large financial institutions a 
source of cheap and easily accessible liquidity. 
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Consolidation of the Banking Industry 
 As the shadow banking industry continued to grow throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and well 
through the 1990s, it eventually surpassed the traditional banking industry in terms of the total 
dollar value of funding available in early 2000 (See figure below). With the rampant growth of 
the less-regulated shadow banking industry beginning to eclipse that of the traditional market, 
commercial banks looked to the 
government for support. The 
argument stemmed from the 
belief that the regulations 
imposed on them by the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 and their 
federal supervisors’ monitoring 
of their leverage ratio severely 
limited their ability to participate 
in the highly active and profitable securities markets in comparison to Wall Street investment 
banks and their money market funds that had very limited, if any, leverage standards.  
In response, the Federal Reserve and Congress conceded to many of the commercial 
banks’ complaints through a series of reforms, repeals, and modifications throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. These decisions included: removing the cap on interest rates offered to depositors by 
banks and thrifts, allowing banks to begin underwriting and trading derivatives on certain assets, 
and permitting banks to provide higher-risk loans with higher interest payments and issue other 
non-traditional loans such as interest-only, balloon-payment, and various types of ARMs to 
customers. Arguably the most important change to the regulations on commercial banks and 
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thrifts was the Congressional passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999 which 
removed the majority of the remaining limitations imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act:  
 
“Now, as long as bank holding companies satisfied certain safety 
and soundness conditions, they could underwrite and sell banking, 
securities, and insurance products and services. Their securities 
affiliates were no longer bound by the Fed’s 25% limit—their 
primary regulator, the SEC, set their only boundaries” (FCIC 
Report, 2011).  
 
One aspect of GLBA’s passing that would prove rather important was the fact that 
securities firms were still allowed the ability to own thrifts and other loan-generating companies, 
an ability that grants them access to many FDIC-backed deposits outside of the Fed’s 
supervision. Effectively, the firewall dividing banks and securities firms had been dissolved, 
allowing the more deposit-focused financial holding companies (Bank of America, JP Morgan, 
and Citigroup for example) to compete with the powerful non-deposit focused Wall Street 
investment banks such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Lehman Brothers.  
In the 15 years between 1990 and 2005, 74 “megamergers” occurred in the banking 
industry, as the 10 largest commercial banks by assets went from owning 25% of the industry’s 
total assets to over 55%, with the five largest U.S. banks—Bank of America, Citigroup, JP 
Morgan, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo—more than tripling their total assets between 1998 to 
2007, from $2.2 trillion up to $6.8 trillion (Jones & Oshinsky, 2009). Mirroring this massive 
consolidation of the commercial banking industry, the five largest investment banks quadrupled 
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their assets from $1 trillion to $4 trillion between 1998 and 2007 (FCIC Report, 2011). The 
landscapes of the banking industry had changed dramatically, and, in order to compete in this 
new environment, you were going to have to spend—and spend big.  
 
Subprime Lending 
 While some banks and S&Ls are often reluctant to provide mortgages to individuals who 
are yet to establish strong credit histories or who have shady financial records, there do exist 
certain firms who specialize in this practice. This type of lending agency is known as a 
“subprime lender.” In order to compensate the higher risk, the lenders require higher interest 
rates on their loans or generate new forms of non-traditional loans, such as the various types of 
ARMs mentioned earlier, interest-only loans (IOs), and principal-only loans (POs). Per Sheila 
Bair, a former assistant secretary for financial institutions at the Treasury from 2001 to 2002, this 
market of subprime lending came to be predominantly dominated by nonbank entities by the late 
1990s and early 2000s (Testimony before the FCIC, 2010). 
 Despite their original affordability, many of these non-traditional loans became 
increasingly dangerous for the borrowers. For example, some of these option ARMs were 
“negatively-amortizing,” meaning that the borrower has the option to rollover their monthly 
payments. However, if they choose to do so, the rolled over interest and principal payments 
accumulate on top of the outstanding balance on the mortgage, resulting in outstanding principals 
that may grow to the point of exceeding the market value of the house purchased via the 
mortgage.  
Many of these agreements had limits on the ratio of outstanding loan to asset value, and 
when these limits were reached, the borrower was often required to pay down a portion of the 
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principal or face repercussions such as foreclosure. Similarly, because many of these adjustable-
rate mortgages were responsive to changes in the federal funds rate, the low rates of 2001 
through 2004 were initially affordable for borrowers, but quickly became drastically too 
expensive when the interest rates inevitably began to rise. In spite of the increased risk associated 
with the subprime loans, they were highly profitable, with Washington Mutual, the second-
largest mortgage originator in 2002, calling it “our most profitable mortgage loan” (Zucker, 
2012). 
 
The Rise of Subprime Securitization 
 Prior to the revolution of the computer and internet, the process of reviewing an 
individual’s application for a loan was a painstaking procedure, requiring the loan originator to 
meticulously review the prospective borrower’s income, assets, loan history, and many other 
related factors. During the mid-1990s, however, the practice began to shift its focus towards a 
more computerized and automatized system, replacing physical review with standardized data, 
such as FICO scores, to determine an individual’s credit worthiness. In a 1996 speech to The 
National Partners in Homeownership, Fed Chairman Greenspan described the revolution by 
stating, “Technology has changed the underwriting, originating, and servicing of mortgages and 
has enabled more efficient pricing of a wider variety of mortgage products tailored for 
increasingly specialized segments of the market” (Greenspan, Feb. 1996). Greenspan went on to 
indicate that the referenced “specialized segments of the market” were borrowers of low-down 
payment mortgages, a form of non-GSE conforming loan.  
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Concurrently, driven by the enactment of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 
1977 and its subsequent strengthening through the 1980s and 1990s, banks and thrifts alike were 
being called upon to increase the number and value of loans to less credit worthy individuals or 
face repercussions, such as rejections of mergers, limitations on new business practices, or the 
denial of opening additional branches. According to Inside Mortgage Finance, a regular 
publication of mortgage-related 
newsletters, the total yearly value of 
subprime mortgages originated grew 
from roughly $80 billion in 1996 to 
its peak of over $600 billion in 2005, 
including a jump from only 
constituting 7.4% of the entire 
mortgage market in 2002 to 23.5% in 
2006.  
With the rise in demand for MBSs and CDOs growing throughout the early 2000s, the 
need for additional mortgages with which to package together as securities continued to grow. In 
order to meet this demand, investment banks and other securities firms urged lenders to further 
relax the already loosened lending standards, including requiring less required documentation (a 
“low-doc” or “no-doc” loan), lower average FICO scores, higher loan-to-value ratios (the ratio of 
the value of the outstanding loan in comparison to the value of the collateralized property) and 
more concentration on simply the value of the asset collateralized against the loan: the 
borrower’s home.  
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Per the FHA’s 2010 report titled Data of the Risk Characteristics and Performance of 
Single-Family Mortgages Originated from 2001 through 2008 and Financed Secondary Market, 
the percentage of total prime borrowers choosing to take out adjustable-rate mortgages vs. fixed-
rate mortgages was just 4% in 2001, but by 2004, this number had risen to 21%. In regards to 
subprime borrowers, a segment of the population that was already heavily involved in the 
adjustable-rate mortgage department, this number jumped from 60% up to 76% over the same 
three years (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2008). 
Furthermore, while big commercial banks and thrifts began to garner the ability to 
securitize and market MBSs without the help of investment banks, Wall Street began moving 
into the mortgage origination industry themselves as a way to maintain a steady supply of 
mortgages with which to build further securities to be sold to the growing number of hungry 
investors. For example, Lehman Brothers purchased six different mortgage lenders between 
1998 and 2004, while Bear Stearns acquired three major subprime originators. At the same time, 
New Century and Ameriquest, two of the largest and “most aggressive” subprime lenders in the 
early 2000s, began to concentrate on “originating loans with characteristics for which whole loan 
buyers will pay a premium” (New Century 10-K, 1999) with these ‘whole loan buyers’ being the 
Wall Street investment banks. In 2003, New Century sold $20.8 billion in whole loans, up from 
$3.1 billion in 2000 (Missal, 2008). Ameriquest jumped from $4 billion up to $39 billion in this 
same time frame, becoming the largest subprime originator in the country (Mozilo & Mital, 
2009).  
Ultimately, this quasi mandated number of subprime mortgages and increased efficiency 
of producing loans compounded upon each other, with the high rate of subprime mortgages 
beginning to spill over from the primary mortgage market and into the secondary market with 
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more and more of these riskier subprime loans being securitized into MBSs and CDOs, 
spreading like a contagion throughout much of the American economy. 
 
Credit Expansion 
While the CRA drove the lending agencies to provide more subprime loans, the Fed’s 
decision to lower the federal funds rate in response to the Dot Com Bubble and the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks only added fuel to the fire of the increasing rate of subprime loan 
generation. Although the federal funds rate is not directly associated with mortgage interest rates, 
the two do have a distant relationship: when the federal funds rate is low, the cost to banks 
borrowing capital is now much cheaper, allowing lending agencies to provide loans with lower 
interest rates and lower down payments.  
Additionally, when the federal funds rate is set low, the value of United States 
government-sponsored Treasury bonds lowers as well. Now, rather than invest in these low 
paying investments, investors both abroad and domestic began turning away from the T-bonds’ 
risk-free 1-3% return rates and instead sought out a different investment with higher, and thought 
to be almost as guaranteed, returns: the housing market. The investors began pouring in, and the 
results quickly became clear as the MBS market reached its all-time high in 2003, a year in 
which over $3.5 trillion residential and commercial mortgage-related securities were issued 
(EXCEL DOC). 
In comparison to just three years prior when the rates in the commercial paper market 
averaged 6.3%, the interest rates of 2003 averaged just 1.1%, while three-month T-bills fell to 
below 1% (US Department of Treasury, Daily Yield Curve Rates 1990-2006). While the 
lowering of the federal funds rate had helped to fend off the relatively short recession of 2001, 
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retaining the federal funds rate at such historical lows meant that mortgage rates, too, remained 
at historical lows with borrowers, lenders, issuers, and investors all taking advantage. In 2003, 
the same year as the MBS market reached its peak, more than 1.8 million single-family homes 
started being constructed, “a rate unseen since the late 1970s” with homeownership rates peaking 
at 69.4% in 2004 (US Census Bureau, “Housing Vacancies and Homeownership: Quarterly 
Homeownership Rates for the U.S. and Regions 1965 to Present”).  
This ballooning of the demand for investments in the housing market fueled on by 
historically low interest rates and increased volumes of mortgages generated and securitized 
drove the value of the housing market higher and higher. Between the years 2000 and 2006, the 
average US home price doubled with the prices in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada—
collectively known as the sand states—growing by more than two-fold (Choi, et al., 2013). All 
the while, wages remained stagnant:  
 
“Over the [period from 2001 to 2004], median income rose 1.6 
percent, while the mean fell 2.3 percent. Over the preceding three-
year period, the median had increased 9.5 percent and the mean 
had increased 17.3 percent” (Bucks, Kennickell, & Moore, 2006).  
 
As home prices continued to soar and wages remained constant, average home price to annual 
income ratio jumped from its historical value of two-to-three-times to nearly four-times what the 
average family made annually. Moreover, “the value of primary residences as a share of 
nonfinancial assets increased 3.4 percentage points, to 50.3 percent, the largest share ever 
recorded in the survey [of consumer finances]” (Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore, 2006). 
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Home Equity 
 While the ability for an individual to refinance their mortgage in times of lower interest 
rates generally help them to lower their monthly interest payments at the lower rate, two other 
forms of refinancing became increasingly popular in the early 2000s: home equity loans and the 
newly invented home equity line of credit (HELOC). The former of the two is a form of loan 
taken out by an individual as a lump sum of cash, using their home equity (the difference 
between the value of their property and the value of their outstanding mortgage balance) to do 
so. This form of loan is generally large in size and is created by taking out a second mortgage on 
your home in addition to the one currently outstanding. On the other hand, a home equity line of 
credit is an offshoot of a home equity loan and functions similarly to a credit card that is based, 
once again, on the individual’s home equity. For a predetermined amount of time, the bank 
provides the individual with an accessible amount of money and allows them to spend it 
generally whenever and however they see fit. With a HELOC, the borrower adds on to their 
original mortgage agreement and only makes payments on the amount of money actually taken 
out.  
 Since these two forms of refinancing are dependent upon the individual’s home equity, 
the red-hot housing market of the early 2000s fueled by low interest rates and increased 
investment in the secondary market sent home equity values continually higher, meaning these 
individuals were able to refinance via either larger home equity loans or larger HELOCs, thereby 
withdrawing and having access to greater amounts of money rather than simply refinancing into 
lower rates to reduce monthly payments. It is estimated that more than one-in-four mortgages 
were refinanced in 2003 (FCIC Report, 2011), while from 2001 to 2003, an estimated $430 
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billion was accessed in a form of home equity loans (Greenspan & Kennedy, “Sources and Uses 
of Equity Extracted from Homes, 2007).  
This growth in refinancing and assumption of debt was disproportionally done by 
individuals with lower incomes. According to the Federal Reserve’s 2004 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, 
 
8.6 percent [of families in 2004] (4.8 percent in 2001) had a 
home equity line of credit with a current balance. Of the types 
of debt considered, home-secured debt had the largest change 
in overall prevalence. The use of such debt tends to rise with 
income. Across wealth groups, it is more nearly equal for 
groups above the bottom quartile; however, homeowners in the 
lowest wealth group in 2004 had the highest rate of such 
borrowing, 81.6 percent...The rising values of primary 
residences over the 2001−04 period outpaced the increases in 
home-secured debt and thus raised the typical amount of home 
equity held by families. 
 
The survey ultimately concluded, “Over the 2001–2004 period, some families may have felt an 
important additional incentive from low mortgage interest rates, rapidly appreciating home 
values, and technological changes that reduced the time and cost of mortgage refinancing,” with 
an estimated 24% of these cash-out refinances being spent on asset such as cars, clothing, 
jewelry, or other real estate ventures and personal savings rates dropping from 5.2% down to 
1.4%. 
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Although this evolving dynamic of rising home prices, a relaxation of lending practices, 
an increase in mortgages generated, greater access to various form of home equity, a stagnation 
of wages, and a decrease in personal savings does not appear sustainable on the surface, Alan 
Greenspan demonstrated his belief in the system by claiming in a 2002 testimony to the 
Congressional Joint Economic Committee, “Mortgage markets have been a powerful stabilizing 
force over the past two years of economic distress by facilitating the extraction of some of the 
equity that homeowners had built up” (“The Economic Outlook”, 2002). He would further 
double down on this argument two years later in a second testimony to the House Committee on 
Financial Services (“Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the 
Congress”, 2004). 
 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises  
 While business on Wall Street was booming due to loosened lending standards and 
historically cheap credit, the shareholders of both FNMA and FHLMC feared a crumbling of 
their market share of the total MBS market. These fears combined with an increased rate of 
refinancing by prime mortgagors and reports of two prodigious accounting scandals that rocked 
both GSEs in 2003 and 2004 left the two firms in desperate need of increased financial 
performance. By 2005, thrifts, investment banks, and commercial banks had taken over as the 
dominant players in the market for home loan securitization. 
 48 
According to Thomas Lund, the former head of FNMA’s single-family lending practice, 
“We faced two stark choices: stay the courses [or] meet the market where the market is” (Single 
Family Guarantee Business: Facing Strategic Crossroads, 2005). In order to better compete with 
the private label mortgage-backed securities, both Fannie and Freddie began loosening their own 
standards for purchasing securities. Moreover, following various amendments to their charters 
during the 1990s, both Freddie and Fannie were mandated to further “facilitate the financing of 
affordable housing for low-income and moderate-income families” (US Code Title 12). 
Accordingly, they were required to hit 
minimums in regards to the percentage 
of mortgages they purchased that were 
generated in order to serve minority and 
low-income communities. By 2005, 
more than 50% of GSEs’ loan 
purchases were required to meet what 
the Fed defined as ‘affordable housing 
goals’ (FCIC Report, 2011). In order to fulfill this minimum, Freddie and Fannie began 
purchasing subprime and Alt-A non-agency securities throughout the 2000s, many of which 
continued to be rated AAA by the rating agencies, using the logic discussed in previous chapters 
as justification. In 2001, the two GSEs purchased less than $10 billion worth of subprime 
securities; by 2005, they were purchasing roughly $125 billion worth of subprime securities 
(FCIC Report, 2011).  
Even with this immense growth in the volume of subprime securities purchased by the 
GSEs, the CFO of FNMA endorsed an approach of further “[increasing] our penetration into the 
 49 
subprime” (Hilzerath, 2008) at their January 2006 board meeting. Once again, because of their 
statuses as GSEs with an implicit backing from the federal government, the riskier and riskier 
investments appeared to be safe in the eyes of the investors. 
 
Conclusion  
 While the decades leading up to the turn of the millennium were stable economically, the 
early 2000s were years of rampant growth across various sectors. As the real estate market 
boomed, interest rates remained low, and the demand for investments in the bourgeoning 
secondary mortgage market drastically jumped, banks and other lending institutions relaxed their 
qualification standards, resulting in a rise in subprime lending. Concurrently, the stagnation of 
wages coupled with low interest rates and increased home equity provided consumers with the 
ability to borrow cheaply and spend lavishly beyond their traditional means. This combination of 
increased subprime lending, expanded subprime securitization, a snowballing of overall financial 
leveraging and a widening gap between consumption and income resulted in record profits for 
many Wall Street firms. The historical success, however, shrouded what had become a ticking 
time bomb for the American economy. 
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Chapter 4: When History’s Largest Ever Economy Collapsed 
“Like Icarus, they never feared flying ever closer to the sun” – Phil Angelides (2010) 
 
 
Introduction 
 Continuing to cite the diversification of the underlying assets in the MBS and CDO 
market, the belief in 2006 was that these investment instruments would continue to perform, and 
if they didn’t, the value of the collateralized asset—the home—appeared to be of ever increasing 
value. Thus, in the case of default, the holders of the mortgages would receive the house and 
investors would still be likely to receive their payments. This theory, though seemingly sound on 
the surface, was highly dependent upon the value of home prices continuing on a steady rise in 
value with interest rates remaining low. However, as the consumer price index (CPI), a 
commonly used measurement for inflation, of mid-2004 began to rise, the Fed sought to mitigate 
this potential for inflation by beginning what would become a series of interest rate hikes starting 
in June 2004. These interest rate hikes would have catastrophically rippling effects throughout 
the entire economy in a matter of months. 
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Unprecedented Delinquency Rates 
 The theory was that the securitization market and shadow banking system of the mid 
2000s dominated by large investment banks had effectively and efficiently distributed risk 
among investors; however, when reviewing the extent to which many of these securities had 
been diversified by investor, the overall diversification was much lower than perceived. As 
securities firms tended to hold some of the highest rated AAA-senior tranches of their own 
MBSs as well as other firms’ CDOs, a relatively small group of “systemically important” 
companies came to be exposed to significant credit risk. All the while, the rating agencies 
continued to use their outdated models of risk evaluation when profiling the various tranches of 
mortgage-related securities.  
 With home prices continually rising nationally throughout 2005, they reached their peak 
in April of 2006. Initially, the pace at which housing prices dropped was sluggish, with Fed 
Chairman Ben Bernanke even calling the predicted decline in the housing market an orderly 
readjustment. In contrast, Moody’s Investors Service, a branch of the credit rating agency of the 
same name, predicted that many of the nation’s metro areas would undergo a collapse in home 
prices and that the drops in prices in several areas were expected to continue on into 2008 and 
2009 (Zandi, Chen & Carey, 2006). Subsequently, the National Association of Realtors released 
a report in 2007 stating that the sales of already existing houses had undergone its steepest 
decline in 25 years, while the St. Louis Federal Reserve of Economic Data (FRED) reported that 
home prices nationally dropped nearly 22% from their 2006 peak to the 2009 trough (FRED, 
2019). 
As the Fed began raising interest rates from 1% up to 5.25% over seventeen consecutive 
times from June of 2004 through September of 2005, the related adjustable-rate mortgages 
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responded in turn: the monthly interest rates on many subprime, Alt-A, and other various 
adjustable-rate mortgages began to rise, leading to delinquency rates of historic proportions.  
Compared to national serious delinquency rates over the prior 25 years that hovered just 
below 2% (Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2008), the rates started a climb to unprecedented levels in 
late 2006, hitting 3% by the start of 2007, 5.25% in mid-2008, and eventually surpassing 10% by 
the end of 2009 with the sand states, which had previously undergone the most intense home 
price increases, reaching levels 
nearly double the national average 
(Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2008). 
All of a sudden, the steady flow of 
cash to investors in private label 
MBSs and CDOs was vanishing 
with the value of the underlying 
assets plummeting.  
 The nation-wide rise in 
delinquency rates forced the credit rating agencies to review their initial evaluations. Realizing 
that their assumptions of correlation between delinquency rates across the thousands of 
mortgages underlying the MBSs were incorrect, they began downgrading many of the previously 
highly rated tranches down to lower and lower levels. By 2006, Moody’s had downgraded 83% 
of all the 2006 Aaa (Moody’s equivalent to Standard & Poors’ AAA rating) and all Baa tranches 
(equivalent to S&P’s BBB) (FCIC Report, 2011). Similarly, all of the firms that had warehoused 
mortgages (meaning held onto as an asset for later purposes) on their balance sheets and that had 
retained shares of the tranches of their own securities were required to write down the value of 
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their assets to market value according to “mark-to-market” accounting practices. Soon enough, 
the complexity of the investment instruments and the instability in the housing market had made 
it so that just about no one truly knew the material value of assets backed by the housing market. 
 
Credit Crunch 
 While the low federal funds rate of the early and mid-2000s allowed banks and other 
firms to borrow short-term money at historic lows, many banks had leveraged their balance 
sheets to catastrophic proportions, with companies such as Bear Stearns having a 2007 leverage 
ratio of 38:1 (Sanati, 2010), meaning that they had $38 of assets for every $1 of equity on their 
balance sheet. Notably, much of this borrowed capital was done via the commercial paper and 
repo markets with firms posting MBSs and CDOs as collateral. When the delinquency rates on 
the mortgages underlying these investments rose and the cash flows slowed, neither the lender 
nor borrower knew what the underlying value of the collateral was. And, if the borrower of the 
capital became unable to repurchase the assets at the specified future date, the lender took over 
ownership of the assets. The previously mentioned delinquency rates, however, made it ever 
more difficult for the MBSs and CDOs to generate consistent cash flows or to retain value in the 
open market. Thus, both parties involved in the transaction were left with either unpayable debt 
or illiquid assets. As this unraveling of the repo market continued, lenders came to demand 
additional assets as collateral and were less willing to accept Alt-A and subprime mortgages. 
 Furthermore, as the housing market bubble began to collapse and subprime lending 
quickly slowed, investors in MMMFs began withdrawing their money. These runs on money 
market funds combined with the decreasing reliability of the financial backing of large, 
previously solid firms and rising interest rates meant that the short-term lending market began to 
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further tighten as firms were unwilling to lend money without reassurance that they would 
eventually be repaid. If lenders in either the commercial paper or repo markets did decide to 
provide loans, they insisted upon shorter and shorter maturity dates, further destabilizing the 
market. Suddenly, the short-term credit lending market had come to a screeching halt.  
 With the short-term 
lending market frozen in its 
tracks, the mortgage lending 
institutions that had previously 
relied on banks to purchase their 
mortgages were now left with 
an increasing amount of poorly 
performing subprime loans on 
their balance sheets. Because these firms were left holding such delinquency-prone loans, some 
of the largest subprime lending agencies quickly became insolvent. In February of 2007, HSBC, 
the largest subprime lender in the US at the time, reported that it would be increasing its 
quarterly provisions for losses by $1.8 billion while New Century released mortgage credit losses 
far higher than expected. By the end of the following month, New Century, once the second 
largest subprime lender in the country, had filed for bankruptcy.  
 
Market Divestiture 
 Much like the characters in J.C. Chandor’s Margin Call, the massive Wall Street 
investment banks quickly realized the true toxicity of their assets and began selling them on the 
open market for pennies on the dollar. After distribution of an internal report in December of 
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2006, Goldman Sachs CFO David Viniar and CRO Craig Broderick realized that the firm needed 
to reduce its exposure to mortgage investments and needed to do so quickly. In turn, the sales 
team in Goldman’s Fixed Income division were directed to sell as many of their ABS and CDO 
positions as possible, despite the reality that it would be at significant losses. Simultaneously, 
however, Goldman was continuing to securitize and sell billions of dollars-worth of CDOs and 
synthetic CDOs to their customers, all the while reducing their own exposure to the market of 
which the securities they were selling were based by entering into the short position of Credit 
Default Swaps. This process of selling vast amounts the MBSs and mortgage-backed CDOs for 
fractions of their original value flooded the market and caused a steep decline in their respective 
values. 
 
The Collapse of Bear Stearns 
 Within the powerful investment bank that was Bear Stearns, there was a subsidiary 
known as Bear Stearns Asset Management (BSAM) that managed two hedge funds focused on 
structured credit: the High-Grade Structured Credit Fund launched in 2003 and the High-Grade 
Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund launched in 2006. Although BSAM was 
under the supervision of Bear Stearns, it was largely left to do as it pleased.  
Finding success since its inception, the High-Grade fund established in 2003 had seen 
double-digit returns in its first three years of existence (FCIC Report, 2011). As is common with 
hedge funds, much of the leverage used to make investments came from the repo market, a 
system that allowed the borrowers of the capital to use a minimal percent of their own capital 
when making investments. While this strategy has the possibility of increasing returns, it also has 
the possibility of seriously magnifying losses. For example, per Alan Schwartz, the former CEO 
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of Bear Stearns, lending in the repo markets via mortgage-backed securities allows investors to 
approach leverage ratios of 20:1, a scenario in which the investor puts forth only 5% of the 
investment with their own money and using borrowed capital for the remaining 95%. When a 
firm approaches leverage ratios of 20:1, a 5% increase in the value of the investment will double 
the investment’s value, but a 5% decrease will wipe out all of the initial investment. According 
to Ralph Cioffi, the manager of the two BSAM funds, “The thesis behind the fund was that the 
structured credit markets offered yield over and above what their ratings suggested they should 
offer,” and as of April 2007, BSAM reported that 60% of its High-Grade fund’s collateral was 
subprime mortgage-backed CDOs (FCIC Report, 2011). 
On April 2nd of 2007, Goldman Sachs, the underwriter of many of the securities into 
which BSAM had so heavily invested, sent the asset management fund marks on its investments 
ranging from 65 cents to 100 cents on the dollar, meaning that some of their investments had lost 
up to 35% of their initial value. On May 1st, Goldman sent BSAM a second round of marks 
ranging from 55 cents to 100 cents on the dollar, to which BSAM marked down the assets in the 
Enhanced Leverage Fund by 18%. As the repo lenders for BSAM began to get word of the 
losses, they started making margin calls, mandating that the funds pay down a portion of their 
outstanding debts or post additional collateral. As lenders began to make these demands, 
investors in the funds started to liquidate their investments, yet the parent company still believed 
that the High-Grade Fund continued to retain value. Bear Stearns chose to sell more than $3 
billion worth of high-grade assets and agreed to pay $1.6 billion to remove the fund’s repo 
lenders, while leaving the Enhanced Leverage Fund to survive on its own. By July 31st 2007, the 
High-Grade fund had dropped by 91% in value; the Enhanced Leverage Fund by 100% (“2 Bear 
Stearns Funds Are Almost Worthless”, 2007). One investor in the High-Grade fund described the 
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situation by stating, “They didn’t realize this was [Hurricane] Katrina. They thought it was just 
another storm” (Creswell & Bajaj, 2007). 
 With the implosion of these two funds, Bear Stearns began to flounder. After assuming 
the nearly $1.6 billion in subprime assets onto their books from the now collapsing BSAM, Bear 
Stearns marked down nearly $2 billion of assets in November of 2007. With the microscope of 
the financial lending 
industry focused directly 
upon the firm, lenders to 
and investors in Bear 
Stearns quickly began to 
scrutinize. Despite 
staying afloat for the 
remainder of the year in 
the face of multiple credit downgrades by Moody’s, a series of runs by the bank’s lenders in 
March of 2008 and JP Morgan’s denial of their March 13th request of a $30 billion line of credit 
caused the firm’s liquidity to drop by nearly $16 billion within just one week (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2008). Bear Stearns was officially on the brink of bankruptcy by the 
evening of the 14th. 
 
The Curious Case of Fannie and Freddie 
 While the mortgage and housing markets began to deteriorate in late 2006 and through 
2008, mortgage lenders quickly realized that the loans they had previously generated were not 
sustainable with the rising interest rates and became willing to refinance the borrowers into more 
affordable loans. The only problem, however, was what to do with these new loans once they 
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had been generated: the private-label MBS market was drying up as investors witnessed the 
declining home prices, the freezing of the short-term lending market, and the total collapse of 
firms that were previously thought to be financially stable. Looking to the government, the 
mortgage originators wanted the GSEs, FNMA and FHLMC, to purchase the new loans. 
Government officials were torn on what to do as they knew the two GSEs, if allowed, had the 
potential to stabilize the market, yet they would be doing so at the expense of their shareholders. 
In the fall of 2007, Fannie and Freddie owned and guaranteed a combined $5.3 trillion on 
mortgages backed by less than 2% of that in capital (FCIC Report, 2011). Despite the weak 
financial states of the firms, many public figures pressured the GSEs to continue purchasing 
these loans when no one else would in order to add stability to a wavering market. By the fourth 
quarter of 2007, FNMA and FHLMC were purchasing nearly 3 out of every 4 new mortgages 
sold. Fannie’s December 2007 financial statements reported having only $44 billion in capital to 
support $879 billion in assets and $2.2 trillion in guarantees on MBS payments (FCIC Report, 
2011). With these levels of leverage, if losses exceeded only 1.45%, the GSE would become 
insolvent. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson knew he would be forced to act soon. 
 
The Collapse of Lehman Brothers  
The idea of a firm’s solvency is a generally a straightforward concept: when the assets 
held by the firm are worth more than its liabilities, then the firm is solvent; if that is not the case, 
then the firm is insolvent. Despite this simplicity, the question of solvency for Lehman Brothers 
by early 2008 was not so.  
Over the course of the late 1990s and early 2000s, Lehman Brothers had grown 
increasingly involved in the mortgage origination industry after acquiring a major Alt-A lender 
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named Aurora Loan Services in 1997 and a subprime mortgage lender named BNC Mortgage in 
2000. By 2003, Lehman Brothers was the third highest loan provider at $18.2 billion but dwarfed 
this number with their 2004 value of over $40 billion in loans provided (Williams, Uncontrolled 
Risk). Although the firm posted record profit years in 2005 and 2006, its exposure to the 
mortgage market was so large that they had “morphed into a real estate hedge fund disguised as 
an investment bank” (Mark Williams, Uncontrolled Risk). Now, following the collapse of Bear 
Stearns, many regulators began to worry about the fate of the firm in regards to both its solvency 
and liquidity.  
Because of the uncertainty in regards to the future of the real estate market and Lehman’s 
significant exposure to it, concerns about the bank’s solvency began to arise. Additionally, its 
dependency upon short term borrowing made it difficult for investors to remain confident in the 
face of potential runs. In this scenario, if Lehman’s short-term lenders believed that the assets the 
firm held on its balance sheet were worth less than what was reported, it was likely they would 
begin to withdraw their funds, require additional assets as collateral, or stop lending to them all 
together. If this run on the bank by lenders were to happen, the firm’s liquidity would drastically 
shrink, and, due to the falling value of the housing market, the mortgage-backed assets they held 
would wipe out the solvency of the bank—leaving it with no ability to operate. By the end of 
August of 2008, Lehman had roughly $600 billion in assets with only $30 billion in equity to 
back it up (“Lehman Brothers Files For Bankruptcy, Scrambles to Sell Key Business,” 2008). A 
5% decrease of the value of its assets would result in a complete wipeout of equity and put it on 
the brink of insolvency.  
As Lehman continued to struggle financially throughout the course of much of 2008, the 
clearing banks between them and the lenders began demanding additional collateral or else 
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significant credit repercussions. Most notably, JP Morgan demanded that Lehman post $5 billion 
in new collateral in the form of cash by the start of the business day on Friday September 12th, 
2008 or else lose their ability to take out additional credit, a mandate to which Lehman decided 
to concede. With the firm continuing to struggle to remain solvent, Secretary Treasury Hank 
Paulson and President of FRBNY Timothy Geithner brought together the CEOs of the largest 
Wall Street firms at the New York Fed’s headquarters in order to devise a plan to save Lehman 
and prevent a catastrophic collapse of the intricate web of financial lending on Wall Street and 
beyond. The fear was that if Lehman began to suddenly sell off their toxic assets in an attempt to 
wind-down their position in the mortgage market, the prices of assets throughout the market 
would plummet, causing additional margin calls to be made across the Street, thereby further 
reducing the already tight liquidity of the credit market. The fear was that a collapse of Lehman 
Brothers posed a systemic risk to the entire economy. 
 
The Collapse of AIG  
 While the real estate market was booming in the first few years of the century, the market 
for Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on mortgage-backed CDOs remained small. During the late 
1990s, the majority of CDS contracts were written up for corporate debt of large investment-
grade firms around the world, such as IBM or GE, with an investment branch of the massive 
insurance company, American International Group (AIG), acting as the “insurance provider” on 
the vast majority of the pools of debt. This branch of AIG, known as AIG Financial Partners 
(AIG FP), was incredibly lucrative in the late 1990s as their aggregate earnings between 1994 
and 2004 reached upwards of $5 billion, compared to just $700 million in the six years prior 
(Greenburg, The AIG Story), mainly due to the blossoming “hedging” market. Additionally, 
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given that the historical default rates of AAA-rated firms in the late 1990s were less than 0.2%, 
the premiums charged by AIGFP to enter into the CDS contracts were less than 1% of the total 
value of the referenced assets (Standard & Poor’s CreditPro: 1998 edition & Moody’s Journal of 
Fixed Income: “Corporate Bond Defaults and Default Rates 1970-1990).  
This early system was highly lucrative through the 1990s and up through 2004; however, 
“From April 2005 to September 2008...AIG’s corporate governance and control, along with AIG 
FP’s fortunes, would change dramatically with disastrous consequences,” a time during which 
AIG FP “accumulated an estimated $80 billion worth of risky financial bets without hedging its 
exposure” (Greenburg, The AIG Story). The most commonly referenced assets in AIG FP’s 
CDSs were now no longer corporate debt but rather common forms of consumer debt such as 
credit card, student, or auto loans as well as some prime and subprime mortgages. While these 
cash flow-generating assets were riskier than high-grade corporate debt, they still functioned 
with relatively low risk and were able to be accurately profiled using the same formula that had 
assessed corporate risk. The semi-risky assets, though, were replaced almost entirely by 
subprime mortgage-backed securities: “The ‘consumer loan’ piles that Wall Street firms...asked 
AIG to insure went from being 2 percent subprime mortgages to being 95 percent subprime 
mortgages” (Lewis, p. 70), with no one raising any red flags. Despite this total shift in 
composition of the assets involved in the CDS, AIG continued to use its traditional model for 
corporate debt. 
Over this time span, AIG had essentially become the largest owner of subprime mortgage 
bonds in the entire market, all the while continuing to receive premium payments of around only 
one tenth of one percent due to the bonds’ statuses of “super senior AAA-rated” tranches. This 
$80 billion value of risky financial bets added to what would grow to eventually be over $441 
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billion by 2008 in the form of credit default swaps (Pittman, 2008), all still done with little to no 
hedging. Furthermore, due to AIG FP’s status as a non-bank entity, they are not bound by the 
same minimum capital requirements as the banks; as such, AIGFP had entered these contracts 
with capital constituting only small percentages of the total value in backing. As soon as the 
credit rating agencies began downgrading their ratings on mortgage-related securities across the 
board, it was only a matter of time before the margin calls came flooding in.  
 
To Bailout or Not to Bailout 
 In response to JP Morgan’s denial of a line of credit to Bear Sterns on Thursday March 
13th, 2008 and in the face of what appeared to be a systemic risk to the economy, the New York 
Federal Bank Reserve (NYFRB) decided to make a $12.9 billion loan to Bear Stearns via JP 
Morgan the following day; however, the news of the loan sent Bear’s stock plummeting when 
the markets opened on Friday morning. By the end of the day, Bear had run out of cash, and the 
NYFRB revoked its loan. Hank Paulson and the rest of the Fed knew that in order to prevent 
Bear’s collapse from spreading to the rest of the market, the government would need to 
intervene. After agreements from JP Morgan Chase’s CEO Jamie Dimon, Bear Stearns’ CEO 
Alan Schwartz, and Bear’s board of directors, the NYFRB established Maiden Lane LLC, a firm 
that would facilitate JP Morgan’s acquisition of the collapsing investment bank. After being 
extended a loan of nearly $29 billion from the New York Federal Reserve and a $1 billion loan 
from JP Morgan, Maiden Lane purchased $30 billion worth of Bear’s assets that JP Morgan 
believed were too risky to assume in the acquisition. In turn, on Sunday March 16th, 2008, JP 
Morgan announced its acquisition of Bear Stearns for $2 per share, a decrease of over 98% from 
their 52-week high (this deal would later be adjusted to a purchase price of $10 per share as a 
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way to reassure the market against other impending collapses). All while the Fed was deciding 
how to intervene in Bear Stearns’ seemingly inevitable demise, the two giant GSEs, Fannie and 
Freddie, were facing their own financial dilemmas.  
The day-to-day operations of the private securities firms that were purchasing and selling 
mortgage-related securities in the early and mid-2000s were heavily dependent upon easily 
accessible and highly liquid capital; the same was true for FNMA and FHLMC. As the MBS 
market continued to decline well into 2008, Fannie’s inability to borrow against its own 
unreliable securities prevented it from easily raising capital with which to continue its operations. 
The Treasury then decided on July 13th, 2008 to extend a line of emergency of credit to both 
Fannie and Freddie, under the agreement that the newly established Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA) would have the right to place the two GSEs into receivership should it become 
necessary. According former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers after reviewing the financial 
statements of Fannie and Freddie in the Spring of 2008, the two GSEs were “a disaster waiting to 
happen” (Paulson, p. 87).  
By September 7th, both 
Fannie and Freddie were placed 
into conservatorship of the FHFA, a 
move that has been called “one of 
the most sweeping government 
interventions in private financial 
markets in decades” (Shins, 2017). 
Now, the amount of financial 
backing able to be extended to the two GSEs was now only limited by the amount of debt that 
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the entire federal government is able to commit to by law, a lifeline that helped keep the two 
goliaths and their market afloat. By the end of 2008, Fannie reported expected losses of up to 
$50 billion with Freddie’s being up to $32 billion. The actual loses turned out to be far more 
significant than expected, the onus of which was placed squarely upon the backs of the American 
taxpayers to the tune of an eventual $187 billion of financial support over the subsequent years 
(Amadeo, 2018).  
After witnessing the government’s intervention in both Bear Stearns’ and the GSEs’ 
cases in the months prior to Lehman’s impending demise, many people believed that the Fed 
would once again provide a lifeline to the struggling Lehman by late August. This lifeline would 
never come. Instead, Paulson, along with the rest of the Fed, proposed that a joint-venture, 
private-sector solution was the only viable option to prevent Lehman’s toxic assets from sinking 
the market, emphasizing that the government would not extend “any form of extraordinary credit 
support...not a penny” (Baxter, 2008).  
It appeared on Saturday evening as though Lehman had found a solution to its impending 
collapse: the London-based Barclays investment bank agreed to purchase Lehman Brothers. Just 
hours later, though, Barclays CEO John Varley relayed to Paulson that the Bank of England and 
the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) had vetoed the acquisition, citing the 
possibility that during the acquisition process,  
 
“Barclays would have had to provide a (possibly unlimited) 
guarantee, for an undefined period of time, covering prior and 
future exposures and liabilities of Lehman that would continue to 
apply including in respect of all transactions entered into prior to 
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the purchase, even in the event the transaction ultimately failed” 
(FCIC Report 2011”).  
 
With Barclays out of the question, the 158-year old institution officially filed for bankruptcy at 
1:45AM on Monday morning in what would be the largest bankruptcy in American history, 
having lost more than 6 and a half times the amount of assets as the second closest bankruptcy in 
history at the time. Despite the sheer size of Lehman Brothers, the world’s largest insurance 
company, AIG, was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy due to its extreme illiquidity, posing an 
even more dangerous risk to the American economy that Lehman did.  
On the same Friday evening in September when Paulson and Geithner called together the 
leaders of the largest Wall Street investment banks to deal with Lehman’s situation, AIG was 
forced to pay back $1.4 billion worth of its commercial paper as investors sought to limit their 
exposure to AIG’s position in the faltering housing market. This repayment came on the heels of 
the insurance giant having already posted a combined $32.1 billion of assets over the previous 
four months in response to their credit default swap positions. As the mortgage-backed security 
market continued to spiral downwards, AIG’s future was not looking bright: their obligations on 
credit default swaps were continuing to rise, the value of the mortgage-backed assets they posted 
as collateral in the repo market were diminishing in value, their credit rating was on the brink of 
a serious downgrade, their lenders were growing more skittish by the day, and the amount of 
liquid capital they held in reserve in the case of possible economic downturn was only fractions 
of what would be required.  
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The morning of the following Monday (the same day in which Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy), the Fed announced its intention to use a syndicate of Wall Street banks led by JP 
Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley to provide a loan to AIG that was 
substantial enough to inject the necessary amount of liquidity into the firm to keep it afloat for 
the time being. That same afternoon, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch all released reports downgrading 
AIG’s long-term credit rating, resulting in an additional $20 billion of collateral needed to meet 
their credit default swap agreements. AIG’s stock price dropped over 60% that day, down to 
$4.76 per share from its Friday close of $12.14 (FCIC Report, 2011).  
 
In response to this decimation of both AIG’s market capitalization and credit rating, the 
Fed’s plan of using a syndicate of banks to provide liquidity to the firm failed. Everyone on Wall 
Street, having witnessed both Bear and Lehman’s collapses, was holding tight to their money as 
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they now watched AIG’s already faltering stability continue to deteriorate. The once AAA-rated 
firm was now unable to access the short-term lending market. What came to be the Fed’s 
response on the following day, Tuesday, September 16th, was a total overhaul of AIG’s equity 
and assets by the government.  
 Realizing that “an AIG failure would be a disaster for the American people” (Paulson, p. 
226), the government, in exchange for 80% of AIG’s ownership, would extend to the firm an $85 
billion line of credit with an annual interest rate of 14%, over 9-times the current prevailing 
market interest rate—100% of which would be secured by AIG’s assets and would be repaid in 
no more than two years (Greenburg, The AIG Story). Despite this massive governmental 
revamping, the $85 billion loan would soon prove to not be enough to keep the insurance giant, 
now a shell of its former self, afloat for long. 
 
Troubled Asset Relief Program 
 Although the Fed had already established the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and 
the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) in March of 2008 as two sources of funding meant 
to increase liquidity within the short-term lending markets, the $300 billion loaned out to both 
investment and commercial banks in their first six months was not enough to support the ever-
destabilizing markets. The Fed was starting to exhaust all of its options.  
Less than a week after Lehman’s bankruptcy and AIG’s structural overhaul, Hank 
Paulson, in conjunction with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and SEC Chairman Chris Cox, 
announced an initiative that he described as a “comprehensive approach to relieving the stresses 
on our financial institutions and markets” in which, through funding provided by Congress, the 
Treasury would have the ability to purchase the “illiquid mortgage assets that are weighing down 
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our financial institutions and threatening our economy” by “clogging our financial markets” (US 
Dept. of the Treasury, Press Release 09/19/2008). The proposal, titled the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), was a $700 billion provision given to the Treasury to purchase the toxic, 
illiquid mortgage-related assets clogging the markets from the financial institutions or to invest 
in other financial instruments such as stock, thereby injecting necessary liquidity back into the 
markets. Outside of the utter size of the program, another problem arose: by purchasing stock in 
these companies, the government would now become a major shareholder in private firms, a 
form of nationalization of a free market. In order to get around this obstacle, the Treasury 
announced that it would only purchase preferred, nonvoting stock that had high-paying dividend 
rates, incentivizing the firms to repay the Treasury sooner rather than later. 
Being officially approved by Congress and signed by President George W. Bush on 
October 3rd, 2008, TARP provided the Treasury with the necessary funds to help re-stabilize the 
markets. On November 10th, the Treasury and Fed jointly announced that they would be 
restructuring the line of credit provided to AIG. Now, using the funds provided by TARP, the 
Treasury purchased $40 billion worth of newly issued preferred AIG stock and reduced the $85 
billion credit line down to $60 billion.  
On that same day, the Fed implemented a plan similar to what it had done with JP 
Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns back in March: establishing Maiden Lane II and Maiden 
Lane III, conduits that would help facilitate AIG’s repayment of their outstanding debt 
obligations. Maiden Lane II, funded by a $20 billion loan from the FRBNY, purchased MBS 
from many of AIG’s subsidiaries, allowing them to repay their original lenders.  Similarly, 
Maiden Lane III, funded by a $24 billion FRBNY loan as well as some collateral posted by AIG, 
would transfer 100% of the debt owed to their financial counterparts at 100 cents on the dollar, 
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with the French investment bank Société Générale receiving $16.5 billion, Goldman $14 billion, 
Deutsche Bank $8.5 billion, 
and Merrill Lynch $6.2 
billion, with an additional 12 
firms receiving a cumulative 
$18 billion (Greenburg, The 
AIG Story).  Ultimately, over 
the next few years, the 
Treasury and the FRBNY 
would end up provided a total 
of $182.3 billion worth of 
loans to AIG. 
 
Economic Fallout  
 Despite the total folding of Bearn Stearns, the continual struggles of the two GSEs, and 
the impeding collapse of Lehman Brothers, the stock market remained relatively stable 
throughout 2007 and into 2008. This stability, however, collapsed beginning in late August 2008, 
a timespan at which the Dow Jones Industrial Average began a drop from a level of 11,362 
points to 8,461 points by the middle of November, a fall from its October 2007 high of over 
14,000 (DJI Interactive Stock Chart | Dow Jones Industrial Average Stock - Yahoo Finance). 
This precipitous drop, along with many others, led to a loss of an estimated 17 trillion dollars of 
household wealth and a peak of unemployment at over 10%, with the United States losing an 
estimated 8.3 million jobs during the course of 2008 and 2009 (FCIC, 2011).  
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While the housing market bubble began to deflate, families who had depended on the 
steady rise in home equity were now underwater as the outstanding loans they owed to their 
lenders exceeded the property value of their home. Many of these individuals simply walked 
away from their homes, opting for foreclosure, a move that would further saturate an already 
oversaturated housing market, dragging the housing market further downwards. As these same 
individuals faced the loss of their home and wealth, they reduced their overall consumption, 
halting nearly all economic growth. Similarly, companies that had depended on quickly and 
easily accessible credit were forced to cut down on inventories and shrink their staff sizes while 
simultaneously facing a consumer base reluctant to spend.  
Additionally, because of the American economy’s vast reach into international markets, 
the shock was felt around the world. European banks and stock markets faced sharp reductions in 
their market values while foreign nations saw their currencies experiencing serious devaluations. 
National governments such as Iceland’s were threatened with bankruptcy, while the International 
Monetary Fund described the situation by stating that the global financial system was on the 
“brink of a systemic meltdown” (Financial System on Brink of Meltdown – IMF). 
 
Conclusion 
 The economic fallout that occurred after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the near 
collapses of Bear Stearns, AIG, and the two GSEs placed the United States economy on the brink 
of disaster. Precipitous drops in stock prices had not been seen in decades, sending the global 
economy into a downward spiral with truly no end in sight. Protests by sufferers who claimed 
that the Wall Street firms reckless spending with no regard for consequences was to blame. Some 
claimed that predatory practices of the lending agencies were the root cause of collapse. Others 
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decried the federal government for their decision to use taxpayer money to bailout private 
companies. Together, many of the complaints centered around one main idea: a lack of morality 
within the financial industry that eventually sent the US economy into a freefall.  
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Chapter 5: What Role Did Morals Play? 
Financial illiteracy is like being in a rain storm and trying to jump in between the raindrops... 
eventually it all catches you at the same time 
 
Introduction 
 In the traditional lending market, one party lends to another party any form of asset with 
the agreement that it will be returned or repaid at a pre-specified date plus interest. Here, both 
parties assume risk in the transaction: the borrower takes the risk that he or she will be able to 
return the borrowed asset plus interest at the agreed upon date, and the lender assumes the risk 
that the borrower will be able to repay them the full amount plus interest by the future date. This 
simple model follows the “originate-to-hold” system in which the lender maintains possession of 
the rights to the loan throughout the life of the contract, thereby holding on to the risk as well.  
In comparison, the “originate-to-distribute” model grew out of the blossoming secondary 
mortgage market. When the mortgage originator sold the rights to the cash flows on the loans to 
one of the GSEs or to a securities firm, they had effectively removed much of the risk involved 
for themselves: they continue to earn fees for managing the loan, collecting payments, and 
enacting punishments for late fees, yet don’t hold as much risk in the case that the mortgagor 
defaults.  
When the originator has successfully mitigated their risk, they transition from being risk-
averse to being more risk-tolerant. This transformation of the individual’s reception towards risk 
inherently changes the lender’s incentives. Now, the incentive is no longer to completely verify 
that the borrow is truly credit worthy, but rather to increase the pure volume of loans provided, 
since the originator’s revenues in this model are much more dependent upon the total volume 
flow of payments from borrower rather than the mortgagor’s ability to make timely payments. 
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This same reasoning can also be applied to the banks who securitized the mortgages: they have 
distributed the rights to the cash flows as well as the risk associated with them to the investors. In 
turn, they too are now far more risk-tolerant in regards to the actual quality of the underlying 
assets themselves, all the while earning fees for underwriting the securities and providing a 
marketplace for the transaction to occur. 
While the shift in incentives does not necessarily justify an absolute conclusion that the 
middle men in this market (the originators and securities firms) were knowingly lending to less 
creditworthy individuals who would inevitably reach a point of unaffordability during the 
lifetime of the contract or that they were consciously misleading investors about the true quality 
of the securities, it does allow for the opening of a conversation about the role of misaligned 
incentives that became rampant throughout the entire financial industry leading up to the 
deflation of the housing bubble in 2007.  
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The Firms: Too Big to Fail 
 Of the many economic concepts and practices that have come to dominate the markets of 
the 20th and 21st centuries, the principal of economies of scale is one of the most important. The 
gist of this concept is that as firms get larger, they are able to spread their fixed costs across 
increasing amounts of products, lowering the average unit cost with each additional unit. In the 
end, the firm is now able to produce more of the same good at a lower average cost, allowing the 
consumer to benefit from this cost reduction. While this theory is most easily seen with firms 
that make tangible products, it is equally applicable to firms providing services—including both 
traditional and investment banks.  
 As these parallel banking industries became increasingly consolidated during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the argument for economies of scale, which financial firms would title 
“synergies,” continued to be at the forefront. Through various mergers and acquisitions both 
horizontally and vertically, investment banks and lending institutions became much more 
efficient in their loan processing practice. Direct access by investment banks to FDIC-insured 
deposit accounts allowed them to generate and securitize higher volumes of mortgages on a more 
streamlined and overall more efficient process. Although the rate of the loans that were 
generated after the mergers and acquisitions of the 1990s that were subprime increased, this 
concurrence of consolidation and popularity of subprime loans did not come as a result of the 
concentration of the industry, but rather as a result of the demand from all sides of the market: 
prospective homeowners realized they could now afford a more expensive or additional home 
with the lower rates; the investors saw how profitable the subprime secondary mortgage market 
had been in the previous decades; and the banks were willing to act as the intermediary between 
the two, simultaneously making a profit and working to meet government standards.  
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Thus, the demand for increasing subprime loans, while augmented by a drifting of the 
banks along the risk-spectrum from more adverse to more tolerant due to the proliferation of 
originate-to-distribute model, was generated by factors outside the financial institutions creating 
the securities, not by the banks themselves.  
 On the other hand, while the consolidation of the banking industries allowed for the firms 
to take advantage of economies of scale, it also increased the levels of moral hazard involved. 
Defined as the ability for one party in a transaction to assume additional risk that negatively 
affects the other party without necessarily affecting themselves, moral hazard is what allowed 
banks and hedge funds to extend their risk beyond reasonable levels and put investors, lenders, 
and other connected banks in positions of extreme risk.  
As the firms had grown to be so large through rapid consolidation and so interconnected 
to each other through the rise in securitization and short-term lending, many of their day-to-day 
operations became so highly dependent upon the ability of the other large banks, lending 
agencies, or GSEs to function that if one piece of the system collapsed, the entire industry and 
beyond would feel the ripples. If this cascading effect is believed to be able to impact a multitude 
of other firms and individuals well beyond the reach of the originally troubled institution, the 
government may find itself in a scenario where it must choose whether to support the failing 
firm, hopefully mitigating the extent of the downfall, or to let the institution crash, taking the risk 
that the effect of the collapse might bring down the rest of the economy with it. The government 
found itself in this exact scenario when firm such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG 
teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. This idea that the size and interconnectedness of the banks is 
too consequential for the government not to react to in times of crisis is known as the “too big to 
fail” argument. 
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While in theory it is rational for the government to bail out the firm in the moment of 
crisis, this implicit backing of the government would lead to other institutions realizing that they, 
too, are so large and interconnected that the government wouldn’t let them fail either. This 
realization allows the other firms to justify taking on riskier projects with potentially higher 
payouts, relying on the implicit backing of the federal government to come to their aid in times 
of crisis. Thus, the argument can be made that despite the risk posed to the entities beyond the 
directly connected firms, letting the struggling institution fail would send a strong message to 
firms of similar size and scope that they must follow sound financial practices or risk becoming 
insolvent with no federal safety net, most likely a positive impact in the long run. This argument, 
in conjunction with the fact that the Treasury had already expanded is balance sheet to historic 
level when assisting Bear Stearns and the two GSEs, is what many people believe to be the 
reason why the government denied Lehman Brothers any federally-sponsored financial 
assistance in their final days. 
In regards to the private sector’s role during the economic collapse, the moral hazard 
fueling the “too big to fail” argument implicitly allowed the massive Wall Street banks to 
amplify their leverage ratios to levels that exposed not only themselves but every other 
interconnected bank, client, investor, and lender to extreme amounts of risk—even in the 
weakest of economic stagnations, all the while knowing that if they were to collapse, the federal 
government would respond in such a way as to keep them and the rest of the economy afloat.  
Two potential conclusions arise from this scenario. First, either the implicit moral hazard 
from the federal government allowed for the banks and lenders to push morality aside and 
knowingly take on high risk loans, justifying these decisions with the record profits they were 
making along the way. Or, conversely, the argument can be made that the firms were 
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experiencing a form of blissful naiveté about how financially stable they were due to the entire 
system’s reliance on the credit rating agencies’ accuracy. Had the CEOs or CFOs of these banks 
truly realized how exposed they were to slight downturns in the market, no financially literate 
banker would have continued to operate as they were, regardless what level of moral hazard they 
had as justification. Thus, it is impossible to conclusively state that a greed-fueled “too big to 
fail” perspective was what brought the investment banks to spend and lend as they had.  
 
Increased Role of Credit Rating Agencies 
Before the ballooning of the securitization markets, credit rating agencies’ main source of 
revenue was in evaluating the risk profile of corporate and municipal bonds. This system 
changed when the securities market of the 1990s began to blossom. As these newly created 
securities needed rating in order to be marketed, the firms issuing the investments turned to 
companies such as Moody’s and S&P to do so. Because highly rated securities are able to be sold 
at higher prices than lower rated ones, security issuers sought to obtain high ratings on their 
soon-to-be issued bonds from the rating agencies in order to attract more investors. 
In turn, an amicable relationship developed between the rating agencies and securities 
firms issuing the MBSs, CDOs, and CDOs squared as all parties involved continued to generate 
profits. While the securitization market exploded in the 1990s and 2000s, the rate at which 
securities firms were bringing in additional securities to be rated mirrored the explosion. When 
the volumes of securities grew so high, the credit rating agencies became short staffed and grew 
increasingly reliant upon the financial models of the firms actually issuing the securities to assist 
in their own ratings. Clearly, this increased reliance on the banks’ forecasts poses a conflict of 
interests, as the securities issuers will want to have their securities rated as highly as possible 
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while the rating agencies are expected to be fully objective in the evaluations. Additionally, the 
increased volume of workload poured onto the ratings agencies combined with their outdated 
models prevented them from being able to accurately profile the risk of the securities.  
Another important aspect of consideration in reviewing the credit rating agencies’ role in 
the crisis was their incessant search for increased profits. Given that there are only 2-to-3 rating 
agency firms within the market and that they all perform almost identically to each other, the 
rating agencies have an incentive to skew a securities firm’s marketed investments towards a 
higher rating. If the firms continue receiving lower ratings on their securities, meaning lower 
sales prices to investors, from one agency rather than the other, the firm will logically do more 
business with the agency that continues to rate their securities higher. Now, in order for the 
rating agencies to remain competitive within the duopoly market or else suffer losses in market 
share, revenue and stock price, they might be forced to subjectively rate the securities higher 
than they actually are. While this practice may provide short-term profits, the long-term 
consequences can be quite severe, as seen by the bursting of the housing bubble in 2007.   
 
Investment Banks: Lack of Transparency 
 The original secondary mortgage market made sense. Mortgage-backed securities 
composed of fixed-rate, long-term, amortizing loans taken out by individuals with legitimate 
credit histories were a safe investment, and, even if there were defaults, the GSEs were there to 
fulfill the debtors’ payment obligations. Even the first prototypes of the non-GSE-sponsored, 
private-label MBSs were sound investments as the firms were generally purchasing only prime 
loans that didn’t happen to meet specific GSE qualifications, many of which were primarily 
based on size and loan-to-value ratios. These mortgages were actually a base for reliable and 
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consistent cash flows as demonstrated by the success of the secondary mortgage market 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the risk that was once concentrated onto individual 
firms was now spread out to thousands of investors, a widely practiced and sound financial 
convention. 
 It wasn’t until the devolution of the MBS into other intricately designed securities that the 
complexity of the instruments increased, the opacity of the compositions became further 
abstruse, and the man-hours necessary to fully investigate the underlying assets became 
unfathomable did these investments become too complicated for the market to accurately value. 
Each one of the thousands of mortgages that make up these securities is generally written 
up in a document of more than 100 pages. Thus, to truly know the value of the underlying assets 
of a single tranche of an MBS requires scouring through thousands of pages of legal jargon on 
top of already complicated financial valuations. Compare that amount of effort to what would be 
required in the review of the documentation that underlies a CDO made up of tranches from 
multiple separate MBSs, which are themselves made up of thousands of individual mortgages 
from varying sources, plus the myriad of other regularly paying assets in the security. Now, 
consider how large that number becomes when you go one step further: the CDO squared. In the 
end, the amount of documentation to sort through just to get to a single underlying loan is 
essentially insurmountable. At the very end of the line is a security that Michael Lewis describes 
as “so opaque and complex that it would remain forever misunderstood by investors and rating 
agencies: the synthetic subprime mortgage bond–backed CDO” (Lewis, p.72). Lewis goes on to 
pejoratively describe this process of adding complexity to the securities market as such:  
 
“Bond technicians could dream up ever more complicated 
securities without worrying too much about government 
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regulation—one reason why so many derivatives had been derived, 
one way or another, from bonds... The opacity and complexity of 
the bond market was, for big Wall Street firms, a huge advantage. 
The bond market customer lived in perpetual fear of what he didn’t 
know.” 
 
 Despite the author’s disparaging remarks regarding Wall Street’s development of 
instruments of ever-increasing complexity, there is nothing inherently immoral nor illegal about 
this practice. Lewis may claim that the financial engineers of the massive investment banks were 
purposely convoluting the marketed securities to such a high degree as a way to establish “a huge 
advantage” over investors, but they were simply doing what banks have done for years: 
providing a market place for transactions.  
In fact, it was common practice for the firm issuing the MBSs and CDOs to maintain 
ownership of some of the super senior tranches for themselves. So, how could it make sense for 
them to purchase securities that they knew were unreliable? If the investors wanted to assume the 
risk that the investment would be profitable, then they should be expected to do the required 
amount of due diligence and not place their entire reliance upon credit rating agencies who were 
dealing with brand new securities just like the investors themselves. 
Ultimately, the conclusion that banks were openly intending to inaccurately report the 
quality of the security to the investors cannot be made; they were simply meeting the market 
wherever it happened to be. 
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The Consumer and Greed  
 The connotations around the phrase “investment bank” generally revolve around negative 
descriptions such as greedy, inconsiderate, or exploitive. Because of these unfavorable images, 
investment banks receive a lion’s share of the blame for the crash, while the average American 
consumer, who played a much larger role in the collapse of the American economy than is 
generally acknowledged, does not.  
During the early and mid-2000s, the historical lows of the federal funds rate should have 
allowed for individuals to take advantage of the situation by purchasing the same home that they 
would have already purchased but at a much cheaper rate. Instead, however, many individuals 
chose to purchase homes that were well beyond their traditional means, using the initially low 
teaser rates and low down payments as justification. Once these interest rates began to inevitably 
tick up, though, the houses they purchased that they could originally afford quickly reached 
levels that were far beyond the mortgagors’ means and defaults began.  
Additionally, due to the red-hot housing market, many consumers sought not only more 
expensive homes but also profit from the real estate and began entering the speculation market: 
purchasing homes to then later be resold at a higher price. This speculation method, however, 
was solely dependent upon the housing market continuing on its steady rise. As soon as the 
prices reached their peaks, the speculators were left holding multiple homes they intended to sell 
of decreasing value, none of which they could afford the payments for and none of which they 
could sell. This rise in speculation by average Americans further increased the supply of homes 
for sale in the already oversaturated market and spurred the market further onto its downward 
spiral into a state in which consumers were unable to afford their new mortgage payments and 
were unable to sell the homes. 
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While it is possible to argue that many of these consumers were simply not financially 
literate enough to fully understand what it was they were signing on their mortgages, that 
argument does not relieve them of all blame for the crash. In fact, the greed that propelled them 
to purchase homes beyond their means as well as the additional homes in the speculation market 
that allowed for the MBS and CDO machines to continue grinding throughout the 2000s played a 
significant role in the ballooning of the housing bubble. These mortgagors eventually beginning 
to default on mortgage payments at rates rarely seen in US history was the beginning of a 
buildup of a snowball effect that would ripple throughout the much of the US and global 
economies. 
 
Government: Too Much or Too Little Regulation?  
 A popular complaint of the 2008 crisis is that the financial system was far too under 
regulated by the government, allowing Wall Street to borrow and spend money with little 
supervision. Although it is true that many firms took advantage of the low federal funds rate to 
leverage their balance sheets to apolitical levels and that deregulation and consolidation of the 
industry may have played a role in allowing this trend to happen, it is also important to note that 
governmental regulation actually forced many firms to make riskier loans than they would have 
traditionally done. Legislation such as the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 and its 
subsequent evolutions made it so that banks and other lending agencies were put into a position 
where they were required to allocate capital to riskier investments instead of safer ones or face 
repercussions. This trend was a key factor in bringing about the rise of the subprime lending that 
quickly infected much of the US economy.  
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Thus, it was this combination of a lack of regulation of some practices of Wall Street and 
the over-regulation of other practices that created an environment in which the perfect storm for 
high speculation in a relatively riskier market took off. In fact, because it was this combination of 
too much and too little regulation that both forced and allowed these firms to fuel the housing 
market bubble towards its eventual demise that it is difficult to assess the role of the government 
in the ultimate collapse of the US economy.  
 
Final Conclusion 
 Attempting to assign blame for the apolitical crash of the 2007-2008 financial crisis is a 
generally unsatisfactory goal as there was no single player in the long line of mistakes that truly 
caused the collapse: the consumers’ greed led them to spend too much; the lending agencies 
were spurred on by government mandates and investment bank demands to generate more 
mortgages; the investment banks borrowed and spent too much on riskier and riskier 
investments; the credit rating agencies were using outdated algorithms to profile too complex of 
instruments; investors in mortgage-related securities were blinded by the profits and failed to 
perform the necessary due diligence to actually know what they were investing in; and the 
government passed legislation that forced lending agencies into precarious financial situations.  
 All in all, arguably the most influential aspect of the entire situation was not actually a 
lack of morals but rather a lack of effort applied by every member of the chain to understand the 
true toxicity of the underlying assets that the housing bubble was built upon. A character named 
Jared Vennett in the film The Big Short, which is based on Michael Lewis’ novel of the same 
name, describes what separated the individuals who foresaw the collapse from those who didn’t 
in a blunt two-sentence statement: “While the whole world was having a big old party, a few 
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outsiders and weirdos saw what no one else could...These outsiders saw the giant lie at the heart 
of the economy, and they saw it by doing something the rest of the suckers never thought to do: 
They looked” (McKay, 2015). This short, two-word conclusion is what truly lies at the heart of 
the collapse: no one dared to actually know what they were agreeing to because the world 
somehow appeared to be less risky than ever before. The blissful naiveté of the entire market 
brought about by seemingly never ending profits fueled this infectious complacency that 
eventually crippled the United States economy. In short, despite the demands for justice against 
the heads of Wall Street that sat at the epicenter of the crisis, the crash was not simply a result of 
a world bereft or morals but rather one of excessive credulity that allowed a $230 billion industry 
to cripple a $15 trillion economy. Ultimately, trust but verify.  
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